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I. PART ONE: 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRAINING PRACTICES FOR 
SURFACE WARFARE JUNIOR OFFICERS 
Executive Summary 
 
This research, funded by the Chief of Naval Personnel yearly allotment to Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) for research in Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education, 
uses quantitative and qualitative data to identify factors that inhibit and promote the 
effectiveness of Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) junior officer (JO) training. The study focuses 
on the period of time between commissioning and becoming SWO qualified.   
This section of the report presents the qualitative data analysis that was undertaken 
primarily to address the strength of the training climate onboard ships.  However, because the 
onboard training, i.e., on-the-job training (OJT) is not independent of other JO training, the 
research expanded to include data and recommendations related to the current introductory 
course (Intro) offered by the Afloat Training Groups (ATGs) in fleet concentration areas, and the 
Advanced Systems and Tactics (ASAT) course offered by Surface Warfare Officer School 
(SWOS) before final SWO qualification.   
 
During the summer of 2011, the researchers conducted focus groups on 15 ships—six in 
Mayport, six in Pearl Harbor, and three in San Diego.   The ship types included CG (2), DDG 
(5), FFG (5), LHA (1), LHD (1), and LSD (1). Focus groups included 12 commanding officers 
(COs), 12 executive officers (XOs), one group commander, and two commodores. Also included 
in the data collection were 53 department heads, 117 senior enlisted, 145 junior officers, and 
officers and senior enlisted at three ATGs.  Groups lasted from 30 minutes to two hours. The 
themes extracted from these sessions are summarized here. 
Presented here is a sample of the voices from the fleet that represent those who 
influence the effectiveness of JO training. All findings are presented regardless of resource 
implications or changes that may occur in the near future for the Intro and ASAT courses. The 
themes presented are those that emerge most strongly from the focus groups and are 
accompanied by representative comments. These data represent a current snapshot of fleet 
perceptions and the strength in which these perceptions are held. 
Onboard Training 
 Requirements placed on ships impact JO training 
Senior officers commented extensively on what they judge as excessive requirements 
placed on ships—many seen as unnecessary—and how this negatively impacts the time 
available to train and mentor JOs. The other side of the issue is that whatever time is made to 
train JOs has become one more burden under the current training system that relies heavily on 
on-the-job training (OJT). Many of these officers view these requirements as oversight from 
above that amounts to a lack of trust and negative leadership. 
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 There is good training going on onboard some ships, in spite of the many requirements.  
However, this is not the case on the majority of the ships visited; ships‘ personnel are stressed, 
frustrated, questioning the quality of JO training, and—in the minds of some—concerned for the 
future of the surface navy. 
Training culture on navy ships works against good training 
With Sailors and officers as busy as they are on ships, many are concerned that SWO 
training is rushed and has become a check-in–the block rather than a thorough attempt to 
ensure that JOs acquire the foundations they need to become future leaders. All department 
heads and senior leaders said they would like to be spending much more time in developing the 
JOs, and some were more successful than others. Many senior officers expressed concern that 
we don‘t have time to train any more but, in the process, are creating a poor culture that will only 
get worse. One JO said: 
We go to the easiest person we can find for a qualification signoff; it‟s the path of least 
resistance. 
JOs see little systematic attention to their training until someone realizes that a deadline 
is looming. Basically, they characterize their training as ad hoc and crisis managed. Several 
comments from JOs included: 
 Training on this ship is fend for yourself. 
 My board was put off six times until 5 days before the 18-month mark. 
Comments on a poor climate for OJT were linked to ship size/type, a cut in underway 
days, the ship‘s place in the training cycle, rigid timelines for SWO qualification, a perceived loss 
of maintenance expertise due to the closing of the SIMAs, and the difficulty in finding meaningful 
jobs and time to train extra ensigns. The researchers observed that, in some cases, a poor 
climate is also influenced by a traditionally tough SWO culture. 
 JOs want standardized and consistent training requirements and practices 
 JOs do not understand why those in aviation and submarines (as well as other navy 
service communities and Marines) are taught to standards while their training has been 
unstructured since 2003 when Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officers Course 
(SWOSDOC) ceased to exist.  Not surprisingly, they take away the message that SWOs are not 
as valued as other officers.  They note that even Sailors are better trained since they attend 
Boot Camp and ―A‖ school. One senior officer said, 
 We throw them into the deep end of the pool and call that training. 
A JO said: 




JO get training help from other junior personnel 
JOs get help in learning their jobs and passing their qualifications from first class petty 
officers, senior enlisted, the person most recently qualified, and second-tour DIVOs.  A concern 
is shared by many JOs and their seniors that they are learning from someone who has only 
been in the job 6 months longer and this may represent ―tribal knowledge passed down 
inappropriately.‖ Senior officers ask, ―Where‘s the quality in that‖? 
JOs on most navy ships visited are demoralized by the state of their OJT 
The culture on board Navy ships with respect to training causes JOs to seriously 
question whether they want to stay in an organization that apparently places little value on their 
development.  JOs know there is a better way to do training and many are resentful about the 
training they receive. Further, they see some ships ―doing it right‖ and see inequality.  They 
question whether they want to stay with the organization that places little emphasis on their 
development. Several comments reflect their frustrations: 
We are bitter because we know there are better ways of doing training than the 
way the Navy does it. 
It makes me feel bad that I can‟t do my job as well as I‟d like because of our 
training. 
There is little mentoring on the ships 
Mentoring spreads the burden of training onboard the ships, it‘s low cost, and it sends a 
positive message of Navy concern.  Yet, very few JOs reported having mentors.  As one said: 
There is no vested interest in our community for mentoring and helping us to advance in 
our qualifications.  It‟s not like other communities.  We do a disservice to our future COs. 
Senior enlisted are concerned with emphasis on “the pin” 
 Senior enlisted feel there is too much emphasis on getting JOs qualified vs. teaching 
them deck plate leadership and also feel that they have to pick up too much of the slack for 
poorly trained JOs, i.e., to the exclusion of their own jobs and training the junior enlisted. 
 Does the pin mean as much as it does in other communities? 
 Many thought that the pin does not mean much due to the lack of rigor in the training 
(and no threat of attrition as in other communities) and expressed concern that the JOs take no 
pride in earning it and that too many do not aspire to be COs, or even department heads.  They 
wonder how we can best create goal-driven, standardized training and implement good 
mentoring without making it another check-in-the-box. 
 Use of the Computer-based Training (CBT)   
Only 1 of 15 ships visited required the use of CBT as part of the SWO qualification 
process; many did not know whether their ships still had this available.  Three of 145 JOs had 
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accessed CBT for some specific aspect of the training.  While they felt it was not an easy 
system to use, they found the content to be useful. 
 Good examples of best training practices were found on three ships 
 Good training practices were found that were used underway, but also in port.  Some 
were unique and others such as cross-decking were just implemented more frequently than on 
other ships.  These practices should be shared widely and implemented to the extent possible. 
Some people had developed extensive training support materials and commented that it would 
be useful to have a centralized source of such materials, e.g., SWOS, that would also push 
updates, to eliminate the inefficiency of ships creating their own materials. 
Intro Course 
 Some of the findings from this part of the study validate the changes intended for the 
Intro and ASAT curricula.  They also serve as a partial needs analysis for the redesign of the 
Intro course. 
 Many officers and senior enlisted know little about the Intro curriculum 
While one senior officer made it a point to talk to his JOs when they returned from Intro (to 
reinforce what they had learned), most knew little to nothing about the curse.  The same was 
true for understanding the Commander Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) policy on waivers for 
course attendance. Thus, the importance of the course is not appreciated. 
 The timing of the Intro course is problematic 
Now recognized by many, JOs often do not get to the Intro course in time for this basic 
familiarization course to be useful.  As a result, Intro is often viewed as a waste of limited 
resources. 
JOs report on board with few of the skills required to be a division officer 
 Senior enlisted, department heads, and senior officers are frustrated with the time they 
have to spend getting JOs up to speed.  JOs are even more frustrated; they don‘t like not 
knowing anything in front of their division. The result is that JOs are demoralized by the lack 
preparation they are given to assume their jobs; this colors their early perceptions of the Navy 
as an organization. 
 Intro should include more hands-on training 
The JOs, all other officers, senior enlisted, and ATG personnel want to see the Intro course 
include more hands-on training that would lead to basic qualifications and, ideally, the course 
would last longer and be offered en route to the ship.   Most frequently mentioned by everyone 
was a desire for the course to include qualifications in 3M, damage control, and administrative 
work.  Also mentioned often were leadership, ship handling, navigation, the SRFB class, 9MM 
qualifications, and time management (the key to all that they have to do). There is a desire to 
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see JOs who are able to do things, not just talk about them; they are significantly concerned 
about the time it takes to train JOs at the expense of their own jobs. 
 Skill levels in Intro classes are too diverse 
Intro courses have students with a mix of background and experience levels that are caused 
in part by the timing of the course, and in part as a function of commissioning source.  This 
results in boredom/wasted time for some students, and difficulties for the ATG instructors to 
teach to such a diverse group. 
The chain of command does not know what to expect from new ensigns 
Frustration is experienced due to the inability of the chain of command to know what to 
expect from JOs reporting to the ship and the time it requires to train them. Whereas 
SWOSDOC had served as a leveling function, the nature and time of Intro interact with 
commissioning source to create a very non-standard ensign. This issue was also associated 
with a commonly heard complaint about the training that SWOs receive relative to aviators and 
those in the submarine community. 
 ATG instructors are highly motivated to teach the JOs 
In spite of being undermanned and teaching the Intro course in addition to their primary 
mission, instructors appear highly motivated to teach the JOs and desire to contribute their 
waterfront expertise to the design of the next introductory course.  In many cases, and based on 
their up-to-date knowledge of the fleet, they have created new materials and added new events 
to the existing curriculum. They continually edit curriculum materials to ensure that they are up 
to date. ATG personnel would like to lengthen the time for the curriculum (they feel that it is 
―firehose‖) and replace PowerPoint with more hands-on training.  
ASAT Course 
 As with the Intro course, some of the findings from this study strongly reinforce the 
changes proposed for the ASAT course. 
Opinions of ASAT are a function of the OOD letter. 
JOs who attend before becoming OOD qualified perceive that they learn more than those 
who already have that qualification. What follows is that the former group perceives more value 
in ASAT than the latter. This was also the subject of comments from of the JOs, COs, XOs, and 
department Heads. 
 ASAT scores are useful 
There is appreciation for the information provided back to the ship by the ASAT scores.  On 
one ship, they were used as input to onboard training and counseling. One senior officer 
commented that they would be more useful if they came to him before the SWO board as this 




With changes to Intro and ASAT already underway, the significant value added to JO 
training may come from changes to the OJT that takes place on the ships.  With more 
systematic attention to OJT, the potential exists for improvement in JO morale and retention of 
the right officers, as well.  More details are provided on JO issues  and best practices and 
recommendations for change are made in the body of this report. In particular, many valuable 









 The major objective of the quantitative section of this report is to determine if already 
available institutional information on newly commissioned surface warfare officers can be used 
to construct operationally useful predictive models to improve individual performance aboard 
ships and in early schoolhouse training programs. It is hoped that Training Officers and mentors 
aboard ships as well as instructors in the schoolhouse training programs can use this 
information in counseling and in directing special resources to those most in need of assistance 
and early enough in the junior officer‘s career to alter behavior of those who otherwise would fall 
behind and become disenchanted in pursuit of a career in the surface navy. 
 The first two parts of the quantitative section are building blocks for the construction of a 
multiple regression models of individual performance at ASAT. Ten causal factors of ASAT 





 Age .  Only those 30 and over (mostly CWOs) have difficulty on many exams 
 Race.  African-Americans and Hispanics face serious challenges on exams, while 
African-Americans face additional hurdles becoming OOD/U qualified.  
 Gender.  Females perform similar to males except in initial SWO Fundamentals exam 
covering initial shipboard experience, suggesting need to better acclimate them early in 
careers. 




 Military Training.  Only impact found is in OCS graduates having greater difficulty in 
acquiring OOD/U qualification, and surprisingly no significant impacts found in 
performance at ASAT. 
 Civilian College Selectivity.  NROTC and OCS Graduates of most selective colleges 
often do better on exams and those from less/non-selective colleges do worse than 
Academy and others from moderately selective schools. Results support incentive 
program of OCS recruiters to focus on better quality schools. 
 Undergraduate Major.  There is evidence that engineering majors (not so much other 
technical majors)  do better on exams, but there is no difference found on shipboard 




 OOD/U Qualification.  The acquisition of this important shipboard qualification is the 
single most important causal factor to ASAT performance. All officers should be required 
to obtain this PQS prior to ASAT. Those finding the greatest challenges include: African-




 Duty Station.  Those based in Japan/Guam are more likely to get OOD/U qualified. 
Owing mainly to self-selection, those based in San Diego achieve highest performance 
at ASAT, while those from Norfolk the lowest. 
 Ship Type.  Officers selecting major combatants, especially destroyers, achieve better 
performance in ASAT than those choosing amphibs and other smaller naval vessels – 
although differences in acquiring OOD/U do not seem to be affected by ship type. 
 Department Assignment.  Very little importance seems to be attached to the major 
department aboard ships regarding OOD/U qualification or performance in  ASAT. One 
major exception is found with those not assigned a major department who face far 
greater challenges in ASAT but are as equally likely to qualify OOD/U. 
 
The last section of the quantitative report uses the above regression models to build 
forecasts of ASAT performance in the SWO Fundamentals exam, which covers material that all 
junior surface warfare officers should know from their first 18-24 months of duty aboard their 
ship. This forecast model is instructive in that we show it is possible to better identify officers 
who most need assistance in learning material presented at ASAT, and can be extended to 
other exams and even shipboard performance as officers acquire various PQS qualifications. 
Three major outcomes characterize this forecast model. 
 Forecast models provide a wide range of estimates of those requiring special 
assistance: 
 Those with strong pre-commissioning backgrounds have extremely low probabilities 
of failing (2% - 4%) 
 Those with weak pre-commissioning backgrounds have extremely high probabilities 
of failing (50% - 70%) 
 
 Individual choices, selections, and assignments together have dramatic impacts on 
ASAT performance: 
 Demographics – especially race 
 College Experience – especially the selectivity of those attending civilian colleges 
 Navy Experience – especially OOD/U qualification and duty station-ship type 
selections 
 
 Forecast Models can be used aboard ships and in classrooms: 
 Training Officers and self-appointed mentors can use predictive models as part of 
their tools when discussing individual performance aboard ships and in preparation 
for classroom schoolhouse training programs 
 Instructors at schoolhouse training programs can use predictive models to help direct 
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This research, funded by the Chief of Naval Personnel yearly allotment to Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) for research in Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education, 
uses quantitative data to identify factors that inhibit and promote the effectiveness of Surface 
Warfare Officer (SWO) junior officer (JO) training.  The goal is to collect information to improve 
the training for JOs who have been impacted by the changes made to the training since the end 
of the Surface Warfare Officer School Indoctrination Course in 2003.   
Previous research at NPS has tracked the some of the impact of the changes to JO 
training (e.g., Bowman & Crawford, 2009, and Crawford, 2010). The present study focuses on 
the period of time between commissioning and becoming SWO qualified.  
 
 The qualitative data focuses primarily on the strength of the training climate onboard 
ships.  However, the research expanded to include data and recommendations related to the 
current introductory course (Intro) offered by the Afloat Training Groups (ATGs) in fleet 
concentration areas and the Advanced Systems and Tactics (ASAT) course offered by SWOS 
before final SWO qualification. It was not possible to focus solely on onboard training because it 
is not independent of the ATG and SWOS courses.  Of course, many other variables influence 
the effectiveness of JO training such as OPTEMPO, ship type, and commissioning source; 
these variables are addressed here, too. 
 
 During the summer of 2011, the researchers conducted focus groups on 15 ships—six in 
Mayport, six in Pearl Harbor, and three in San Diego.   The ship types included CG (2), DDG 
(5), FFG (5), LHA (1), LHD (1), and LSD (1). 
 Focus groups included 12 commanding officers (COs), 12 executive officers (XOs), one 
group commander, and two commodores.  Comments from these officers are referenced 
throughout as being from ―senior officers.‖  Also included in the data collection were 53 
department heads, 117 senior enlisted,  145 junior officers, and instructors and senior enlisted 
from  three ATGs.  All groups were told that there would be no attribution by name or ship, 
rather, themes would be extracted from the data and reported by rank. The questions asked in 
the interviews are shown in Appendix A. 
 As noted above, the study expanded beyond  the strength of the training climate 
on ships to include the courses that bookend that training—Intro and ASAT.  The study, then, 
addresses the variables that influence the training climate for SWO JOs from the time they are 
commissioned to full SWO qualification. 
Presented here is a sample of the voices from the fleet that represent those who 
influence the effectiveness of JO training. All findings are presented regardless of resource 
implications or changes that may occur in the near future for the Intro and ASAT courses. The 
themes presented are those that emerge most strongly from the focus groups and are 
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accompanied by representative comments. These data represent a current snapshot of fleet 
perceptions and the strength in which these perceptions are held. 
                                Analyses 
Onboard Training 
The training on board the ships visited ranged from ad hoc to exemplary of best 
practices.  However, one theme was constant throughout --the requirements placed on ships, 
decreases in manning overall but with an increase in the number of ensigns on board, a 
decrease in the number of underway days, a perceived loss of expertise in maintenance, the 
ship‘s place in the training cycle, and a rigid timeline for getting JOs qualified have made it very 
difficult to do good JO training and mentoring. The quality of the JO training that takes place on 
ships was questioned by many. Improvements in Intro and ASAT will help enhance JO training, 
but OJT will still be required and—with the current pace of operations onboard ships—there will 
still be problems with JO training.  
Requirements placed on ships impact JO training 
 Almost all comments other than those from JOs were offered in the context of the 
many requirements place on ships—many seen as unnecessary—and how this negatively 
impacts the time available to train and mentor JOs. The other side of the issue is that whatever 
time is made to train JOs has become one more burden under the current training system that 
relies heavily on on-the-job training (OJT). As will be seen in the data analysis, there is good 
training going on onboard some ships, in spite of the many requirements.  However, this is not 
the case on the majority of the ships visited; ships‘ personnel are stressed, frustrated, 
questioning the quality of JO training, and—in the minds of some—concerned for the future of 
the surface navy. As one senior officer said: 
There are so many more requirements now, for example, reports that repeat the same 
things and requirements that don‟t seem useful to anyone on the ship, for example 
PROBOOK. And we can‟t delegate as much due to optimal manning.    Note: there were 
many negative comments about PROBOOK from the JOs as just ―one more thing to do.‖ 
It‘s interesting that no one understood the purpose of PROBOOK, which likely would 
have eliminated all complaints. 
With changes to Intro and ASAT already underway, the significant value added to JO 
training may come from changes to the OJT that takes place on the ships.  These changes will 
be more difficult because they rely in part on cultural changes and in part on the awareness of 
senior officers of the serious need for such changes--in spite of how busy they are with the 
many requirements that are placed on them outside of JO training. The researchers took away 
the strong message that frustration could be decreased and training quality increased by such 
changes. With more systematic attention to OJT, the potential exists for improvement in JO 




Training culture on Navy ships works against good training 
Traditions may not be valued by all. The SWO community is used to doing more with 
less and being a tough culture. Undeniably, there is value to the culture for supporting a mind-
set that is useful for long hours, hard work, and deployments.  When this culture is applied to 
training, it can be played out in ways that don‘t support either effective or efficient training and 
cause JOs to seriously question whether they want to stay in an organization that apparently 
places little value on their development.  For example, the value of asking a JO to ―find the 
solution‖ can range from excellent learning to what is seen as a ridiculous waste of precious 
time depending on the nature of the task. 
There was a lot of discussion at all levels on how much guidance JOs should receive for 
their OJT.  What some saw as spoon feeding, others saw as a lack of standards and goals.  The 
issue is also worth considering in light of the changing values of the young people entering the 
service who may be less accepting of some of the traditions of the surface navy. 
We throw them into the deep end of the pool and call that training.  (senior officer) 
There is no vested interest in our community for mentoring and helping us to advance in 
our qualifications.  It‟s not like other communities.  We do a disservice to our future COs. 
(JO) Note: few JOs reported that they have mentors. 
We need more of a training mentality; the value of training others should be incentivized.  
(JO) 
Have we evolved to a check-in-the box mentality toward training in the SWO 
community?  With people as busy as they are on ships, many are concerned that training is 
rushed and has become a check-in–the block rather than a thorough attempt to ensure that JOs 
acquire the foundations they need to become future leaders. All department heads and senior 
leaders said they would like to be spending much more time in developing the JOs, and some 
were more successful than others. 
People don‟t take quals seriously; it‟s a check-in-the block.  (JO) 
Training on this ship is fend for yourself.  (JO) 
The focus of training in the Navy seems to be on check the box vs. getting it right; 
whatever it takes to make the ship look good.  Same with the qualifications; get them 
done fast.  (JO) 
We look to the easiest person we can find for a qualification signoff; it‟s the path of least 
resistance.  (JO) 
We have lost the ability to self assess and we see it in deck plate performance.  (senior 
officer) 
Training has been streamlined for efficiency and we‟ve lost quality. (department head) 
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There is no accountability for ensuring that you understand the PQS; they just sign it. 
(JO) 
Work comes first, quals come second.  This is not what we were led to expect.  (JO)  
The DIVO goal is to leave the ship with the SWO pin so we are set up for check-in-the-
block instead of the well-rounded officer and war fighter. (senior enlisted) 
We feel the time pressure.  Millington wants them ready to roll to their next jobs so they 
need to be qualified. (senior officer) 
Training is given the lowest priority onboard.  (JO) 
Quals are done by crisis management.  A year into it they see we‟re behind and then 
blame it on us.  (JO) 
With no dedicated training, there is no pride; we‟re just going through the 
motions…everyone pulls on you.  What are you supposed to do? (JO) 
The harsh reality is that mission is first and that training is sometimes put off.  (senior 
officer) 
My board was put off 6 times and finally happened 5 days before the 18-month mark. 
(JO) 
The pin does not mean as much as it does in other communities.  They are going to get 
the pin eventually. (JO) 
In the aviation community, there is an ever-present threat that you won‟t make it.  In the 
SWO community, there is no threat of attrition—this is wrong, we should be more 
rigorous. No child left behind doesn‟t cut it. They should feel good about it  [earning the 
SWO pin]. (senior officer) 
The same opinion was offered by some with respect to ship exercises: 
We‟re checking the box in completing a drill.  You have to pass at a certain level.  If not, 
you have to rerun the entire thing so you just say „good enough.‟ It‟s the same thing with 
quals. (JO) 
 Commenting on the culture in the Navy in general, one senior officer said: 
The young people deserve and cry out for leadership and it‟s not a waste of time to try.  
We‟re making corporate decisions in the surface navy.  We‟ve forgotten who we are—
what made us great…we‟ve lost the fun and the camaraderie. 
Another senior officer said:  
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We are not passing down the fun aspects of our culture.  Everything is negative 
management; don‟t do this…where‟s the motivation in that?  The JOs see it, along with 
the long ours put in by their seniors, and they don‟t like it. 
Structural constraints. The training culture is driven in part by the Navy‘s organizational 
structure including organizational requirements and ship size/type. There were more difficulties 
seen on frigates, which were attributed to manning issues. 
It would be good to have single longer tours. They learn this ship well then have to go 
right off to another type of ship and learn again. We don‟t get enough return on 
investment. (senior officer) 
The DIVOs get moved around too much on the ship; it‟s the „DIVO shuffle.‟ We have to 
keep training their replacements or pick up the slack because there is no one to replace 
them. (senior enlisted) 
JOs get scattered everywhere so they don‟t know their jobs.  (senior enlisted) 
One of the difficulties in port of doing JO training is that the JOs are off at so many 
different schools—it‟s hard to get them together at one time.(senior leader) 
With respect to other structural concerns, many talked of the difficulties imposed by a cut 
in underway days, the ship‘s place in the training cycle, and the difficulty in finding meaningful 
jobs and time to train extra ensigns.  
 Another aspect of the culture that drew mixed opinions was whether or not there is a 
stigma for a CO to write a letter of Failure to Attain.  Some of the senior officers interviewed said 
that was definitely not the case, and others said it definitely was.  One commented that the 
SWO pin would have far more meaning if ―not everyone got it.‖ 
With all the same pressures of other ships, some managed to do better training than 
others.  Clearly, they had a stronger training culture than others as the value placed on training 
was reflected at all levels of ships‘ personnel. 
They put me through the training.  There was an outstanding, organized training plan 
and we did training 2-3 times per week. The chiefs and everyone knew that was how it 
was.  (JO) Note: this was training done in port. 
There are choices on how a ship prioritizes training.  (JO) 
In particular, good examples were heard of formal, dedicated training time while 
underway and in port, and these are discussed in a subsequent section of this report.  
Such issues are difficult to sort out but this aspect of the culture may impact retention 





JOs want standardized and consistent training requirements and practices 
        The JOs want standardization and consistent requirements  in their training.  These 
comments were often made in the context of how this is in place for aviators and submariners.  
Why not for SWOs? 
       They would also like more standardization on their SWO Boards.  Many said that they have 
heard that getting qualified on one ship may not meet the expectations of the CO on the next 
ship. 
       Further, JOs on one ship noted that they were all getting dinked on the same qualifications 
at the same time and wondered why training could not be organized around those particular 
qualifications. 
 Our Tuesday night sessions are ad hoc—not tailored to the PQS. (JO) 
You think you‟re ready for the SWO Board and you ask each department head what 
you‟ll need to know and they‟ll tell you but you don‟t always know what to ask.  You don‟t 
want this to turn into „stump the chump.‟ (JO) 
You‟re in a military culture that demands structure, but we don‟t have it in our training.  
(JO) 
The process is so flexible, there is no process.  (JO) 
Could there be classes, say once a week after INTRO with those dedicated instructors at 
ATG?  There must be other ways to do in port training. 
No one really thought he was unprepared until it was too late because no one was 
tracking his progress.  (department head) 
The SWO Tracker is helpful when used correctly. On this ship it is just a „wall of shame.‟  
(JO) 
Use of the SWO Tracker is sporadic  (JO) 
We have all these instructions and standards for everything on ships, like INSURV.  Why 
don‟t they train us to standards? (JO) 
Why can‟t we be trained like aviators, marines, or submarine officers?  We should all 
come out with a standard baseline like these guys. (JO) 
       On those ships where training was less ad hoc in port,  JOs were appreciative 
JOs get training help from other junior personnel 
JOs get help in learning their jobs and passing their qualifications from first class petty 
officers, senior enlisted, the person most recently qualified, and second-tour DIVOs.  
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Department heads, XOs, and COs would like to be doing more training but feel that they don‘t 
have time due to the many requirements levied on the ships—especially in port. 
We may end up learning from someone who has only been in the job 6 months longer 
than us.  It‟s tribal knowledge passed down.  (JO) 
The JOs get tribal knowledge passed down to them by other qualified or second-tour 
DIVOS.  Where‟s the quality in that? (department head) 
We‟ve cut manning, maintenance, etc. We need a critical eye now more than ever 
before and we don‟t have time to help.  (department head) 
I‟d like to spend the majority of my time training DIVOs; it‟s just the opposite.   (senior 
officer) 
The senior watch officer is too busy to help.  (JO) 
What training? (JO) 
That JOs get help from people who may not be giving them the best information is 
widely recognized and causes many to question the quality of the training received. 
JOs on most navy ships visited are demoralized by the state of their OJT  
The factors discussed above add up to JOs who are frustrated.  Further, they see some 
ships ―doing it right‖ and are even more frustrated by the inequality. 
We are bitter because we know that there are better ways of doing training than the way 
the Navy does it. 
It makes me feel bad that I can‟t do my job as well as I‟d like because of our training. 
The senior enlisted perspective 
 Senior enlisted comments were centered around the difficulties faced by ensigns 
because of all the requirements they face, the lack of time they have to train because of the 
requirements they (senior enlisted) deal with, and, in particular, their sense that time to train on 
deck plate leadership has been pushed aside. Many feel there is too much emphasis on ―the 
pin‖ to the exclusion of more important things. 
Another key frustration was the extent to which they have to ―pick up the slack‖ for the 
ensigns who are always off the ship going to schools yet are still so poorly trained. 
Our time to train them is greatly truncated and varies with the schools they have to go to 
for different jobs.  We‟re stretched so thin.  Should I have to teach him his whole job?  
We‟re already picking up slack above and below because of manning.  If I‟m spending 
more time training DIVOs, I‟m spending less time training the enlisted.   
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There are critical NEC shortages being filled by less-qualified enlisted because of 
manning. I need to spend time training these guys, too.   
The senior enlisted talked a lot about the many difficulties facing the JOs: 
We need to take it easy on these JOs with the collateral duties so they can get their 
training done.   
The JOs who are doing well really get stuck with a lot of collateral duties. 
We put so much on them with collaterals, the training cycle, PQS.  At what point is 
anything going to be quality?   
I feel sorry for them.   
DIVO responsibilities are too high, e.g., ATFP, we wouldn‟t give an E-4 or E-5 that 
responsibility, much less a DIVO.  Are we expecting too much of them? What is the 
quality of the person doing the job?   
They get thrown into the deep end and they don‟t have the life experience for it.   They 
still have the college mindset.  
 This last comment relates to a theme heard on almost every ship and this was never in 
response to a direct question but, rather, always volunteered:  a concern that there is increased 
fraternization between JOs and the enlisted due to common preferences, more enlisted having 
college degrees, they are the same age, and an absence of adequate leadership training. 
The department head perspective 
 The department heads‘ comments reflected the key themes seen throughout the other 
interviews and focus groups, i.e.,  heavy requirements driving out time to train JOs as much as 
they would like, especially in port; a strong desire for a standard baseline of JO skills when they 
come to the ship; the difficulty of getting JOs together at one time for training when they come 
and go from the ship so frequently for schools and scheduled events; the difficulties of 
decreased manning; and a description of the best practices they have seen (described below). 
 Those department heads who had prior service commented on the impact of the closure 
of the SIMAs (as did senior officers). With the closure of the SIMAs, maintenance work was 
contracted out and a teaching capability was loss. The result, many believe, is a degradation in 
the maintenance skills of the enlisted, and chiefs‘ mess. This, of course, has direct implication 
for the work of the JOs. 
We used to call the SIMA when we had a problem.  There was a lot of expertise there 
and someone would come right over and work with our guys on fixing the problem; we 
learned from them.  Now we call for a tech assist, they fix it and leave. It takes longer to 
get them here, too.  Not only that, there is more paperwork to make this happen. We 
need to bring back the SIMAs so we will have more self sufficiency. (department head) 
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The enlisted techs have been impacted by outsourcing of the maintenance because they 
are no longer doing it.   (department head) 
Tech reps are often former chiefs.  We just pay them more now.  (department head) 
When SIMAs were shut down, we lost expertise.  (senior officer) 
The senior officer perspective 
 Senior officers‘ comments reflected the key themes with additional concerns offered by 
some for the future of Navy leadership.  These officers commented on what they see as 
excessive requirements and oversight from above that are placed on them, which they see as 
amounting to lack of trust and negative leadership and directly affecting the time available for 
JO training. 
 They also commented on some bigger picture issues such as skill loss from ―Perform to 
Serve,‖ and the closure of SIMAs, which adds to their concerns for the Navy‘s future. They were 
very concerned overall about the JO training pipeline. 
One senior officer was an exception.  He said, 
I will  make it work with whatever SWOS model they implement.…I can train them. 
 There are so many people who are hardworking and loyal to the Navy who are trying to 
make a very difficult system work.  Should they have to deal with so many limitations? Good 
organizations realize the importance of good training—ultimately for good performance but also 
for the positive expectations it sets about the organization. As one senior officer noted: 
Our current system is set up for failure. 
Senior officers were the primary source of comments about best practices in JO training 
they had used and seen over the course of their careers.  We turn to those next. 
Best Practices 
Most ships reported at least one day of training for JOs while underway; the quality of 
the training was better on some ships than others but there were good examples of best 
practices that should be shared. 
Training in port, of course, is much more difficult to accomplish due to the many 
requirements placed on the ship, but there were good examples here, too.  
Where notably good training existed,  it was appreciated by JOs and the value placed on 
training was undersood throughout the chain of command. 
Cross decking. Cross decking, already done by most, is certainly a best practice.  Many 
of the senior officers interviewed discussed cross decking. This was frequently mentioned as a 
way to help ensigns get qualified while in port. While most see this as a valuable tool, some 
expressed concerns that their JOs might pick up bad habits or be treated as ―less than…‖ in 
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favor of the ship‘s own ensigns. On the other hand, one senior officer mentioned that he had let 
another ship do the OOD qualification for one of his JOs. 
Another concern was that cross decking adds to another ship‘s problems since they 
have extra ensigns, too.More frequently, however, people valued cross decking.  In Pearl 
Harbor many positive comments were heard about this being easy there because it is such a 
small, close-knit waterfront, (Another example of this is that the XOs communicate daily.) 
We just got back from deployment and took 5 ensigns from [another ship] on board.  We 
gave them meaningful jobs and welcomed them to the wardroom tight waterfront.  We 
lend out our people all the time, e.g., another ship is short a QM so we send ours over 
almost daily. 
 Scheduled, systematic training. JOs appreciate regularly scheduled, formal (vs. ad hoc) 
training, especially where the department heads and more senior officers are involved.   
  One ship conducts training Tuesdays and Thursdays while underway.  These classes 
were taught by department heads or second-tour DIVOs. Many ships reported at least one day 
of training while underway, some more systematic than others. On another ship, the senior 
watch officer had weekly one-hour lectures planned 4-5 months in advance for both underway 
time and, with more difficulty, for in-port training. 
 Another department head is putting together a formal program for JO qualifications but 
which will also focus on DIVO jobs.  This program will be used underway. 
 A ship that we did not visit but heard of and subsequently contacted has a very formal 
plan that should be shared widely. This plan is attached in Appendix B. 
 Training plans. Several instances were heard of a qualification progression letter put out 
by the senior watch officer that laid  out everything required with very clear goals and 
expectations. 
 There were also several instances of creating dedicated training time when the JO first 
reported on board and this was done instead of giving them ―meaningless jobs‖ that they don‘t 
feel good about.  
Let them work on their qualifications so they feel good about themselves.  (senior officer) 
 On one ship the TrainO was a first-tour division officer. The JOs appreciated this 
because they said the TrainO was still close enough to their situation to really understand  how 
to help them with the structure they need for their training. 
Another senior officer said to a JO, 
Your job is to learn the ship for the first month; learn the people. 
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 Tailored training.  One ship trains on a topic per week while underway and works on it 
until all the JOs are qualified. These sessions are taught by chiefs or whoever is qualified and 
they make their own PowerPoint to use. 
One senior watch officer  uses test scores from ASAT as feedback for designing the 
SWOU curriculum and for counseling weaknesses. 
Many ships use the watch bill as a training tool. 
 A formal murder board before the SWO board was appreciated by the JOs. 
 In one case, the DIVOs themselves try to get together for an evening a week and get a 
chief to talk to them on some topic. 
A culture for training and assessment to reinforce the training. Two ships reported 
extensive debriefing of major ship events in the wardroom as a training opportunity. On both of 
these ships, the culture supported honest assessments of their performance—good and bad—
where open feedback, and thus good training, was promoted. ―We‘ve broken the code here on 
not saying bad things. A senor officer said: 
A climate of honest assessment comes from a willingness to learn. We are honest and 
brutal; we don‟t varnish the truth but it‟s not pointed, either.  We do a reasonable job of 
calling ourselves out to set a good example. We need to learn to call ourselves out. If I 
do it, it‟s a stick, if you do it, it‟s a carrot.  You must be able to see your own failure.  We 
don‟t secure from any event until the debrief is complete. 
 Further, this same ship approaches the feedback from a systems perspective, i.e., 
addressing the effects of given events throughout the system and they fit into the bigger picture.  
Included here are mission area briefs with one coordinator for each area where the JOs can 
listen and hear what is important to their ship now and in the future.  Similarly, all department 
heads are brought to the bridge for major evolutions since they will become XOs next. 
 Similarly, another senior officer makes it a practice of never being first to speak  first in a 
debrief so that no one is intimidated by what he said.  He finds that by the time it is his turn to 
speak, most if not all of the things he would have said have been mentioned and he sees this as 
very positive. He said: 
It‟s a great training tool.  They listen to what everyone says and don‟t want to make the 
same mistakes.  
One senior officer commented that debriefings take place on other ships but they are not 
necessarily common, especially with the supporting culture they have created. 
The first senior officer mentioned in this section further promotes learning by having 
department heads share staterooms with a first-tour DIVO who is not in their department.  The 
result is that unofficial mentoring takes place.  This seems particularly important in that few 
mentoring relationships were reported across the many JOs interviewed. 
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The same senior officer has formed a process action team with membership from all 
levels, including new JOs to look at JO training ―from soup to nuts.  They will deliver a product 
and they will all have buy in.‖ This sends yet another message to all that training is valued. 
Another senior officer said that he conducts training every week for the JOs, including 
those who are qualified.  He makes it fun by using movies or books for discussions. This same 
officer said that you should use every opportunity to teach and mentor including, ―just go down 
and talk to them.‖ 
Last, one senior officer implemented  active mentoring by all 1110s for new JOs. 
The impact of training resources 
Comments were made about training resources that, if addressed, have the potential to 
improve OJT. 
 The Navigation Trainer. There were several comments that the simulator on board 
ship was either ―useless‖ or ―not working.‖  However, we learned later that only one ship had 
learned how to use it. 
 Materials. There were any number of examples of people on ships creating training 
for the JOs but all had to seek out or create materials to support the training.  Many comments 
were made about the desirability of having SWOS push materials for onboard training.   
 Why is everyone designing their own stuff to train JOs? (department head) 
 I would like to have training materials sent to us but not mandated by SWOS. (senior 
officer) 
One suggestion was made to create materials for IPADs that would include every 
reference one would ever need.  It could be centralized at SWOS where new updates could 
periodically be pushed out. 
We should move to new media that the JOs use.  (senior officer) 
JOs would like some kind of study guide for their qualifications.  They note that while the 
PQS has all the references, they want something that‘s easier to go through so that time is not 
wasted. 
Intro  
Some of the data collected concerning the Intro course tend to validate the changes that 
have recently been proposed for that course. However, other changes to the course are 
suggested in the data that are worthy of consideration.  Effectively, this part of the study can 
serve as a needs analysis for the design of the new course from the perspective the customers 




Many officers and senior enlisted know little about the Intro curriculum 
Surprisingly, many officers and senior enlisted knew little about the Intro curriculum.  
While one senior officer made it a point to talk to his JOs when they returned from Intro (to 
reinforce what they had learned), most knew little to nothing about the course.  The same was 
true for understanding of the Commander Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) policy on waivers for 
course attendance. For example, 
JOs aren‟t touchable while they‟re in Intro and they‟re doing nothing here. (senior 
enlisted) 
 Some COs want the JOs to come back to the ship during Intro and it creates an 
awkward situation for the JO. (senior officer) 
Negativity and frustration could be avoided if everyone knew what was in the course and 
the importance of the course.   
The timing of the Intro course is problematic 
Due to the majority of JOs being commissioned in June, and the need to level load the 
Intro course, many JOs do not attend the course early in their first ship tour.  If they have to 
meet their ship on deployment, reporting to Intro is further delayed and the basic familiarization 
provided by the course loses value.  
Many from all ranks said that—to have value—the introductory training must take place 
en route to the ship.    But, if they are onboard too long before the course, they may not need it 
and it may take them away from valuable training time such as underway time.  All felt that any 
underway time is more valuable than Intro where there is a choice.   
Many—especially the senior enlisted—feel that whatever training rhythm they can 
establish is disrupted by the ensigns leaving the ship for Intro and the many other schools they 
attend.  Further, a delay in INTRO is particularly difficult for the JO who already has a division.  
DIVOs do not want to abandon their divisions for 5 weeks so they don‘t,  in spite of the policy of 
dedicated training time for Intro.  It is also difficult for the senior enlisted who have to pick up the 
slack while the JOs are gone. 
Intro works well when it takes place right after they get to the ship. (senior officer) 
Senior enlisted are getting pulled in more directions than before with PTS,  fewer people, 
and more inspections and requirements.  We need to share the training load.  If the JOs 
can do stuff before coming here, then we can train on the equipment. (senior enlisted) 
All the training off ship is painful for those left behind and those who are left behind may 
be missing valuable training time on deployment. (JO) 




JOs report on board with few of the skills required to be a division officer 
 Similar to the experience with the SWOS-at-Sea training, there is frustration all around 
with junior officers reporting on board with few of the skills required to be a division officer.  As 
many of the comments above indicate, senior enlisted, department heads, and senior officers 
are frustrated with the time they have to spend getting JOs up to speed.  JOs are even more 
frustrated: 
 I didn't like not knowing anything in front of the division. (JO) 
Enlisted come better prepared than ensigns because they have boot camp and “A” 
schools.  (JO) 
One department head commented on the difficult and sometimes emotional 
conversations he has had with JOs who are angry at being expected to do things they were not 
trained for.  Although, he said, ―some will embrace it as part of the SWO process.‖  
Intro should include more hands-on training 
The JOs, all other officers, senior enlisted, and ATG personnel would like to see the Intro 
course include more hands-on training that would lead to basic qualifications and, ideally, the 
course would last longer and be offered en route to the ship.  Their comments offered 
suggestions for content, but also addressed the impact of JOs not having the skills they 
mentioned. Most frequently mentioned by everyone was a desire for the course to include 
qualifications in 3M, damage control, and administrative work.  Also mentioned often were 
leadership, ship handling, navigation, the SRFB class, 9MM qualifications, and time 
management (the key to all that they have to do). 
Baby SWOS is knowledge; we need skills.  (JO) 
They need to know how to DO zone inspections, spot checks; and write casreps--not 
just TALK about them. (senior officer) 
They must have the 3M qualification; it is an essential part of their jobs.  (senior officer) 
We need more on personnel issues like evals and things that impact the enlisted. (JO) 
Note:  this is a comment echoed by many senior enlisted. 
Admin isn‟t the fun part but it‟s their main role. (senior officer) 
They can‟t write evals, awards, or messages.  They have never seen the Navy 
Correspondence Manual and make ridiculous chops on stuff I wrote that‟s going up the 
chain. (senior enlisted) 
No one knows how to write a message, so I have to baby sit. When I spend additional 
time training DIVOs, I give up being good at my job, running a department.  Since they 




An 0-1 is supposed to evaluate a PO3 doing spot checks and he doesn‟t even know 
what it is?  This is one more thing we end up doing. (senior enlisted)  
We now have useless ensigns who can't become DIVOs right away. We have to show 
them how to do everything like writing casreps. We are doing far more basic training now 
when we could be doing more advanced training...tactics and where mission fits in.  
(department head) 
Many department heads and senior officers commented on the value that would be 
added by having decommissioned ships or yard patrol crafts in Introductory training to help 
them understand what to expect on the ship and what it is they are trying to accomplish. 
The wet trainer at ATG is fun, wet, cold, etc. if you know what it really means on the 
ship, you know people could die. 
The chain of command does not know what to expect from new ensigns 
 Frustration is also experienced due to the inability of the chain of command to know 
what to expect  from JOs reporting to the ship and the time it requires to train them. Whereras 
SWOSDOC had served as a leveling function, the nature and time of Intro interact with 
commissioning source to create a very non-standard ensign. This issue was also associated 
with a commonly heard complaint about the training that SWOs receive relative to aviators and 
those in the submarine community. 
We must have some kind of Baseline coming in. What can I expect when they come to 
the ship? (senior officer) 
I would like to see them trained to a very focused standard like Marines at The Basic 
School.(senior officer) 
Three weeks for OCS and 5 weeks of training for ROTC and USNA? Really? This 
makes no sense. (department head) 
The key issue here is the inability to anticipate/create OJT that will support all ensigns. 
Sill levels in Intro classes are too diverse 
Difficulties for the ATGs in teaching a group of students that has a mix of background 
and experience levels are caused  in part by the timing of the course, and in part as a function 
of commissioning source.  This results in boredom/wasted time for some students, and 
difficulties for the ATG instructors to teach to a diverse group. 
Intro is taught to lowest common denominator. (department head) 
USNA and some of the ROTC units teach some of the same stuff we do. (ATG 
instructor) 
Time and resources expended training those with skills advanced beyond the basic level 
would be better spent in more advanced training or letting them stay on their ships. (Again, the 
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waiver policy is not well known or understood and many stories were hear from all ranks about 
Intro being ―a waste of time.‖) 
ATG instructors are highly motivated to teach the JOs   
 In spite of being undermanned and teaching the Intro course in addition to their primary 
mission, instructors appear highly motivated to teach the JOs.  In many cases, and based on 
their up-to-date knowledge of the fleet, they have created new materials and added new events 
to the existing curriculum. They continually edit curriculum materials to ensure that they are up 
to date. 
 Examples of add-ons are situational awareness briefs on factors JOs should be tapped 
into given their particular AOR, a briefing on the nuclear training path, and qualifications such as 
the swim qualification and range training that are now expected but were undertaken originally 
on the initiative of the ATGs. 
Interestingly, ATG personnel comments reflect those of others interviewed for this study.  
They would like to lengthen the time for the curriculum (they feel that it is ―firehose‖) and replace 
PowerPoint with more hands-on training. They feel strongly that any introductory curriculum 
should be taught before the ensign reports to his/her ship.  They would also like to add 
segments on how to deal with the unexpected, conflict resolution, how to pass inspections, how 
to create and present briefings, writing skills, and a more in-depth treatment of the chief-JO 
relationship. 
ATG personnel feel they could benefit from having all ATG critiques put on line for all 
FCAs so they could monitor trends and share lessons learn. They would also like more 
advanced simulators such as those that support the aviation and submarine communities.  
Even the Army has integrated simulation exercises. (ATG instructor) 
ATG critiques show that JOs would like to have brief synopses of every job they might 
be doing.  Instructors suggest that this could be a good candidate for computer-based training 
since there are so many jobs ensigns could go to; SWOS could push updates for such a 
program. 
ATG personnel further recommend that in the proposed introductory course, SWOS 
should capture the expertise at the ATG (current fleet knowledge and lessons learned) for the 
design of the new curriculum.  They are hopeful that senior enlisted will be kept in the mix of 
instructors due to the criticality of that chief-JO relationship, and that any new program will be 
resourced with the current software that the Navy uses (for example, for navigation). 
ASAT 
 Less information emerged about ASAT as compared to the Intro course and the OJT 




General awareness of ASAT 
 Once again, researchers were surprised at how many officers and senior enlisted were 
unaware of the course content of ASAT. As a result, some negative comments from  those other 
than JOs might need to be discounted. 
They [the JOs] say ASAT is a big party.  We could have them here doing something 
constructive. (senior enlisted) 
They  [JOs]  look forward to it because it‟s a vacation; they already know the stuff. 
(department head) 
Senior Enlisted (and one senior officer) see ASAT as one more instance of Ensigns 
being off of the ship leaving work behind for others. Several senior officers questioned the intent 
of ASAT.  This lack of awareness of the ASAT curriculum can feed negative perceptions—
reality-based or not—that don‘t help the JOs to advance in their training, and, result in a missed 
opportunity for other officers to reinforce and support what is learned at ASAT. 
 Opinions of ASAT are partly a function of the OOD letter 
Opinions of ASAT seem to depend largely on whether JOs have already received the 
OOD letter when they attend. This was observed from the perspectives of the JOs, COs, XOs, 
and department Heads. JOs who attend before becoming OOD qualified perceive that they 
learn more than those who already have that qualification. What follows is that the former group 
perceives more value in ASAT than the latter group.  
ASAT rounded me out…good to be in a classroom setting with people from different 
ships. Great networking opportunities. (JO) 
ASAT was a waste; there was too much emphasis on ship handling where I wanted 
more on advanced tactics. I (JO) 
I want my officers to have the OOD qualification before going to ASAT.  I‟ve seen much 
better results when this is the case. (senior officer) 
To some JOs, ASAT is in stark contrast to their more ad hoc onboard training: 
ASAT gets it right.  They are very clear on goals and expectations. 
As with Intro, some JOs felt that ASAT taught to the lowest common denominator 
because of having the mix of students with and without the OOD qualification in the same 
classroom. A former SWOS instructor commented on the difficulties of teaching to such different 
knowledge levels. 
 As with the Intro course, time and resources expended training those with skills that 
have already been mastered would be better spent in more advanced training or keeping them 




 ASAT Scores are useful 
 There is appreciation for the information provided back to the ship by the ASAT scores.  
On one ship, they were used as input to onboard training and counseling. One senior officer 
commented that they would be more useful if they came to him before the SWO board; this was 
not always the case. Another senior officer thought it would be very useful to see the scores of 
his JOs relative to those on other ships. 
The scores from ASAT, and presumably the next version of ASAT currently under 
development, are a potentially valuable training tool that should be used to the extent possible. 
Computer-based Training (CBT) 
Only 1 of 15 ships visited required the use of CBT as part of the SWO qualification 
process.  Many did not know whether their ships still had this available.  Three of 145 JOs had 
accessed CBT for some specific aspect of the training.  While they felt it was not an easy 
system to use, they found the content to be useful. 
The JOs would like to know more than a week ahead that they will be getting tested on 
the CBT at ASAT.  Some mentioned doing group study before ASAT, but they would have liked 
more time. A senior officer commented on the need for more advance notice as well but this 




● Make SWO qualification a number of underway days to reduce the difficulties of a one-size-
fits-all deadline.  A formula could be developed by CNSF. 
● Create a month of dedicated time for the new JO to get to know the ship, the people, and 
begin the qualification process.  Avoid assigning meaningless DIVO jobs. Ideally, this first month 
would be under the guidance of a mentor who could provide some guidance, some points of 
contacts, and answer questions as needed.  Care should be taken in assigning mentors as 
experience documented throughout the literature (across many different kinds of organizations) 
shows that ambitious mentorship programs involving assigned mentors, usually fail.  The 
mentor should not be overused and should be incentivized by the culture of the ship. This will 
place more emphasis on quality vs. check-in-the-block training. 
● If tour lengths can‘t be increased, minimize the number of DIVO jobs on board for deeper 
learning for the JO and less impact on the senior enlisted. 
● Have a plan in place for every JO.  SWO Tracker could be used in conjunction with initial 
guidance from a mentor or the senior watch officer.  A formal plan sends a good message about 
the value of training. 
Murder boards should take place before the SWO board on all ships. 
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● Tailor the short, on board sessions to particular qualifications that JOs are working on. 
● To the extent possible,  COs, XOs, and department heads should be involved in training even 
if that is something as limited as monthly meetings, especially in the early stages of a JO‘s time 
on the ship.  This could go a long way in easing some of the frustrations the JOs feel concerning 
the low priority training is given. 
● Disseminate information on how to use the on-board simulator.  For example, an ATG 
instructor could meet with selected department heads and JOs to talk about the potential value 
of the trainer. 
● Encourage use of CBT for reference and ASAT preparation. 
● Create a centralized source of materials for on-board training. Conduct a cost benefits 
analysis to determine the value of delivering these new materials on a new medium such as 
IPAD. Collect content that others have developed and build on that. 
● Review the leadership week for the new INTRO course to ensure that issues of fraternization 
and the JO-chief relationship are covered in sufficient depth.  A  needs analysis might reveal 
other areas of need change as well. 
● The senior watch officer should encourage JOs to take the initiative to identify training topics 
of interest and he/she can recommend an officer or senior enlisted person to teach the topic. 
● Use the watch bill rotation as a training tool. 
● Use ASAT scores as feedback into the design of the on-board training plans. 
● One senior officer recommended  ―The Armed forces Officer,‖ which is an 80-page book that 
should be required for JOs. Another is the ―Division Officer's Guide.‖ He said these used to be 
used and should be brought back as required reading. 
● Consider the many comments on the loss of maintenance expertise.  If these are determined 
to be valid, consider how they should be addressed. 
● Share all best practices through some medium that will be noticed. 
● Conduct a thorough review of all requirements placed on ships to eliminate redundancies and 
ensure criticality. 
Intro 
●  Develop and implement strategic communications to publicize the content and importance of 
the next introductory course to enable those in the chain of command  to reinforce—and 
support—what the JOs have learned. 
●  Use a medium for these communications that is not a Navy message or an instruction that is 
likely to be ignored. 
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● Execute the proposed timing of the new course to take place en route to the ship. While 
logistically difficult, this will do a lot to eliminate frustration and improve training quality. 
●  Listen to fleet input in designing the next course. Consider all content recommendations and 
ensure the ensigns come to their ships with major qualifications signed off. If desired, the 
recommendations made in this research for content in the new course could be validated by a 
very quick survey.  The impression of the researchers is that ship personnel would be only too 
happy to have their opinions heard. 
●  Design the next course to even out the commissioning source variable to the extent possible.  
For example, there could be a separate track for Naval Academy officers.  Or, ensigns could 
―test out‖ of course segments for special instruction or early return to their ships. 
●  Use YPs in the next introductory course. 
●  Design the next course to be more rigorous than the current Intro course to send the 
message that SWOs take their training as seriously as Marines, and the aviation and submarine 
communities.  For example, ensure that some of the exams are not multiple choice (a 
suggestion made by one of the ATG instructors).  Multiple choice tests, while easy to grade, are 
not necessarily good measures of learning. 
●  Work with the ATG to capture their expertise and lessons learned in designing the next 
course. 
●  Keep senior enlisted involved in teaching the next course. 
●  Consider using the aviation model for the design of a future course where an officer 
designated 1160 would receive his/her SWO pin before reporting to the first ship, and then 
qualify OOD on the specific ship class. 
ASAT 
●  As recommended for the Intro course, develop and implement strategic communications to 
publicize the content and importance of the next course to enable those in the chain of 
command to reinforce—and support—what the JOs have learned. 
●  Use a medium for these communications that is not a Navy message or an instruction that is 
likely to be ignored. 
●   Execute the next version of ASAT as proposed such that the skill levels of students will be 
more even and more can benefit from the training. 
●  Share exam scores from the next version of ASAT and publicize the value of them to COs for 
enhancing the value of JO training 
●  If CBT is used as the basis for the pretest of the next version of ASAT, ensure that JOs know 




QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASAT PERFORMANCE 
Changing Role of Classroom Training 
             The role of classroom training in the early development of junior surface warfare officers 
has changed dramatically since the new millennium. Prior to the fall of 2003 all newly 
commissioned surface warfare officers were indoctrinated at the Surface Warfare Officer School 
Division Officers Course (SWOSDOC) in Newport, RI that lasted up to six months. This program 
was required of all officers regardless of commissioning source. In September, 2003 the navy 
dramatically altered the training pipeline of its junior surface warfare officers by eliminating the 
SWOSDOC classroom training and instead sent Ensigns directly to their first ship where they 
would be trained on-the-job through learning by doing. A series of CDs were issued to each new 
officer which was a backup for their on-board training, including tests over the subject material 
relevant to the required Personal Qualification Standards (PQS) they were expected to obtain. 
At the time, it is believed this change would not only save significant training costs but also 
shorten the time junior officers become qualified and thus more useful to the ship‘s crew. 
 Along with this change, Surface Navy instituted a three-week ‗leveling‘ classroom 
training course called Advanced Ship-handling and Tactics (ASAT) that was scheduled after 
officers had achieved their Officer-of-the-Deck/Underway (OOD/U) qualification but before they 
would appear at the ship‘s Surface Warfare Officer Board (SWO Board). This board is 
composed of the ship‘s senior leadership who provide the final say on whether or not an 
individual is ‗fully warfare qualified‘ as a junior officer. Attainment of the ‗SWO Pin‘ is the first 
major requirement in the surface warfare officer training pipeline and all junior officers are 
required to enroll in the ASAT course offered at Newport, RI as part of becoming a warfare 
qualified officer. 
 Due to the irregularities of ship deployments and scheduled ship repairs, mandating the 
requirement of having the OOD/U prior to enrolling in ASAT was changed in March 2009 and 
since then roughly 50% of junior surface warfare officers are able to attain their OOD/U 
qualification before ASAT. This change has resulted in a diverse knowledge base of incoming 
junior officers as well as affecting the level and scope of instruction at ASAT.  
 An additional change was incorporated in September 2009, when Surface Navy realized 
that many newly commissioned officers were not able to acquire the needed skills of a Division 
Officer while also trying to pass the myriad of PSQs required for qualification as a surface 
warfare officer. Ship manning levels were made smaller, while op-tempo remained high and in 
many cases increased over time. These policy changes, among other things, drastically affected 
junior surface warfare officer training as Division Officers had increased responsibilities and 
duties as did Chief Petty Officers – all with fewer personnel underneath them to do ‗more with 
less.‘ As noted in the qualitative discourse, many junior surface warfare officers became ‗the 
forgotten‘ aboard many ships. To address this critical shortage, Surface Navy reinstituted a 
shortened version of SWOSDOC, called SWOS INTRO. As noted earlier, OCS candidates at 
Newport were shuffled into an extended four-week classroom training program at Newport, 
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while Naval Academy and Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) graduates were sent 
to a five week waterfront program at selected bases. The personnel attached to a base‘s 
Advanced Training Group (ATG) were given a course of instruction used at the Newport INTRO 
so that the initial training would be similar for all newly commissioned officers. At first, these 
INTRO courses were offered at our largest naval bases in Newport and San Diego, and later 
offered in Mayport and Pear Harbor. Currently, Surface Navy is developing a new ―INTRO‖ 
course to be taught by instructors at ATGs in Norfolk and San Diego. The length and content of 
instruction are currently under review and development. 
 For this project, the historical account of the many changes in classroom training for 
junior surface warfare officers is important because differing tests and exams were given in the 
various classroom training programs, and often differing tests were designed for a given 
classroom training program over time. As such, the analysis of test scores becomes rather 
complicated since there have been so many changes to instruction during this period of 
transition. Data availability of tests administered as part of the evolving INTRO program is 
especially sparse as relatively little is known about what goes on in INTRO by the fleet and no 
information regarding INTRO test scores is made available to ships to which the newly 
commissioned surface warfare officers are assigned. The test results at ATGs are especially 
sparse as many were not made operational until recently and others don‘t have data bases 
readily available with scores attached to personal data, such as commissioning source, college, 
major along with demographic data. 
 As such, the quantitative analysis undertaken in this analysis focuses on the various 
tests and exams given at ASAT. As indicated below in Table 1, no test scores from the first 
three years were recorded by ASAT since they were instructed to design a classroom training 
program in which everyone would ‗pass‘ and officers could focus on learning without the threat 
or fear of intimidation that some would attach to scored and recorded tests. This policy was 
changed in 2006, during which time three test scores were recorded – Surface Warfare 
Fundamentals, Maritime Warfare, and Rules-of-Road. The CDs given to each new officer 
focused on these core competencies and ASAT was a natural classroom setting to examine the 
knowledge acquired during ship board training as well as new information given during 
classroom sessions at ASAT. Navigation replaced Maritime Warfare exams in 2010, when a 
Final exam was also instituted. The analysis given below will cover all these five exams, and will 
emphasize the Surface Warfare Officer Fundamentals exam as it is the only one given 
throughout the entire change of instruction at ASAT. It is also important to this study as it covers 
the material newly commissioned surface warfare officers are expected to learn while aboard 
ships prior to attending ASAT.
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Start End Start End
None Available 2,073 29-Sep-03 5-Jun-06 158 198
Surface Warfare Fundamentals 4,744 10-Jul-06 6-Jun-11 199 273
Maritime Warfare 3,890 27-Nov-06 1-Nov-10 205 264
Rules-of-Road 4,630 21-Aug-06 6-Jun-11 201 273
Navigation 960 4-Jan-10 1-Nov-10 251 264




Class Dates Class Number
TABLE 1. 











Convening Class Dates 
 
As mentioned earlier, Surface Navy removed the requirement of having officers 
complete their OOD/U PQS in March of 2006. As shown in Figure 1, instantly the proportion of 
officers with this critical PQS fell to between 60% to 70%, and over time has continued to fall 
until less than one in two officers attending ASAT do not have their OOD/U qualification. As will 
be covered in detail below, having this qualification is one of the most important factors 
explaining how well ASAT attendees score on all exams. Thus, we believe it is important to 
focus on the period when there is a diversity of basic fundamental knowledge and as such all 
empirical analysis will begin with Class 239, which enrolled in ASAT during March 2009. 
 
FIGURE 1. 













 As seen in Figure 2, roughly 250 officers have enrolled in ASAT each quarter over the 
30 month period, with larger enrollments during the first and third calendar quarters. This pattern  
reflects the fact that most officers spend between 12 to 16 months before coming to ASAT and 
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Start End Start End
Surface Warfare Fundamentals 2,223 9-Mar-09 6-Jun-11 239 273
Maritime Warfare 1,735 9-Mar-09 1-Nov-10 239 264
Rules-of-Road 2,222 9-Mar-09 6-Jun-11 239 273
Navigation 914 4-Jan-10 1-Nov-10 251 264




Class Dates Class Number
most graduate from college in the second and fourth calendar quarters. It may be noted that 
class size remains relatively constant as more class sections are added during quarters when 
enrollment is higher. 
 
FIGURE 2. 









The sample size for ASAT enrollees differs by the length of time each exam was offered. 
As shown in Table 2, three exams - Fundamentals, Rules-of-Road, and Maritime Warfare – are 
recorded for the early classes beginning in March 2009 (Class 239), but only the first two were 
constantly administered through the last available class (273) offered in June 2011 and have the 
largest sample sizes (2,223). The Maritime Warfare exam was eliminated in November 2010 
along with the Navigation exam. The latest exam administered at ASAT is a Final Exam having 




























Std. Dev. = 15.313
N = 1,187
 The average length of time between commissioning and attendance at ASAT is 21 
months and as shown in Figure 3, those obtaining their OOD/U do so on average one month 
prior to ASAT.  
 
FIGURE 3. 










































Specification of ASAT Performance Models 
 
 A major objective of the quantitative portion of this report is the specification of multiple 
regression models of junior surface warfare officer performance at the ASAT leveling 
schoolhouse training program. First, we will describe the measures of performance on ASAT 
exams, followed by a discussion of how the various explanatory factors are grouped and scaled 
when used later in the regressions. Care is taken to explain the theory and justification of why 
the explanatory variables are included along with how each factor is expected to affect ASAT 
performance. 
 
ASAT Exam Performance 
  
The distribution of test scores of the five ASAT exams are depicted above in Figure 4, 
along with assigned pass/fail rates. With the exception of Rules-of-Road exam, the passing 
grade of 75% results in 20% to 30% of test takers failing on their first attempt. Generally, officers 
are given one follow-up exam to pass, and the vast majority of retakes reach a passing grade.1 
Material covered in the Roles-of-Road exam are so critical to basic knowledge of a surface 
warfare officer  that a higher passing rate of 90% is assigned, resulting in a fail rate of 30% on 
the first time the test is administered during the ASAT course. 
The procedure followed in the report will present two levels of data analysis. In this 
section, purely descriptive analysis will be undertaken with two objectives in mind. First, tabular 
analysis will be presented to define clearly what factors are available to explain ASAT 
performance and how they are measured and scaled for the more complex regression models 
to follow. Second, actual differences in ASAT performance across the various factors are 
presented in this section so that the reader understands the two-way relationships one observes 
in the surface navy. It is important to emphasize that this part of the report purposively presents 
simple bivariate relationships and ignores other more complex relationships existing among a 
multitude of factors related to the early classroom training experiences of junior surface warfare 
officers. In the next section, we build more complex multiple regression models that are 
designed to estimate the independent impact of each explanatory factor described below on 
ASAT performance.  
Differences between the simple two-way observed outcomes and the more complex 
multivariate modeling outcomes will be noted where appropriate. The purpose of building more 
complex econometric models is to explain deviations from the mean exam scores as well as the 
probability to fail an exam on the first attempt. Particular emphasis is placed on the latter as 
                                                          
1
 A letter is sent to the Commanding Officer of the officer’s ship for those who never pass an ASAT exam even after 
retakes are given. It is expected that these officers are examined more closely than otherwise on the material covered 
by the exam by the ship’s personnel in charge of training aboard ship. 
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most deviations from the mean are relatively small and don‘t appear to be very meaningful to 
decision-makers. Rather, what is important is whether or not individuals acquire sufficient level 
of understanding to pass an exam at the designated level. Failure to do so reflects such a lack 
of basic understanding that an individual must know that he or she must go back and learn the 
material if he or she is to be held accountable for a minimum level of understanding whether it 
be Rules-of-Road, SWO fundamentals, maritime warfare, or navigation. 
The research methodology followed throughout this quantitative portion of the report 
relates three groups of explanatory variables to explain ASAT performance. Besides observed 
navy experience factors, we also include two important types of variables that are external to 
Surface Navy – demographic characteristics and college experience prior to commissioning. 
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20-21 22-23* 24-29 30+ TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 83.0 81.2 80.2 80.0 81.0
Maritime Warfare 90.4 88.3 87.7 85.3 87.9
Rules-of-Road 93.1 91.8 90.9 89.4 91.4
Navigation 79.6 80.0 77.4 67.1 77.9
Final Exam 84.9 83.3 80.9 80.2 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 10.8% 49.0% 27.1% 13.0% 100.0%
20-21 22-23* 24-29 30+ TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 18.3% 20.3% 22.8% 21.4% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 3.2% 4.1% 3.7% 10.4% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 21.3% 28.1% 32.7% 35.2% 29.5%
Navigation 26.3% 20.6% 31.5% 63.7% 28.7%
Final Exam 3.6% 6.8% 10.9% 27.3% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 10.8% 49.0% 27.1% 13.0% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY AGE GROUP: (N = 2,223 )
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY AGE GROUP: (N = 2,223 )
Explanatory Factors 
 
1.  Demographics.  First an individual‘s age, gender, race, and marital status are 
included as basic explanatory factors that are expected to be related to performance on ASAT 
exams. Roughly one-half of newly commissioned officers age 22-23 are commissioned directly 
out of college and are identified as the control group in later regressions. Some, however, are 
older that may indicate having worked first in the private sector (i.e., OCS graduates who first 
look for and some who find employment in the civilian labor market) and others who enlisted 























commissioned officer (―mustangs‖) or are Limited Duty Officers (LDOs) or Chief Warrant 
Officers (CWOs) who are chosen to be a Division Officer in the surface navy. These individuals 
generally have additional ‗firm and industry specific human capital‘ compared to those 
commissioned immediately following college graduation, and may therefore be expected to 
attain higher average scores and be less likely to fail an ASAT exam. 
 As shown in Table 4, age appears to be inversely related to performance at ASAT, with 
older officers realizing lower average scores and experience higher failure rates on exams. 
These results are counter intuitive to the human capital theory expressed above. One possible 
explanation is that older individuals in the data set are mainly non-commissioned officers who 
enlisted in the navy directly out of high school whereas younger individuals are commissioned 
officers having recently graduated from college. Academic ability differences between the two 
groups could then explain this inverse relationship. 
 
 A second demographic variable, ethnicity, is commonly included as explanatory 
variables in models of classroom performance. It is not uncommon to find minorities scoring 
below that of the white majority owing to a host of factors including differential family 
expectations of the value of education and differences in school resources and overall quality of 
early schooling. In Table 4 below we note lower scores and higher exam failure rates of 
minorities, especially those of African-Americans. 
 Similarly, gender is typically included as another demographic variable specified in 
classroom performance. Female college students generally attain the same or higher test 
scores and therefore should be expected to achieve similar test results in ASAT to that of 
males. One possible exception, however, is that the navy culture and environment has 
traditionally been male oriented and as such females may either explicitly or implicitly may be 
excluded from assistance and guidance onboard ship in the day-to-day learning by doing 
atmosphere. We note in Table 5 below, female average test scores and failure rates mirror that 
of males in all exams except for SWO Fundamentals, and the failure rates on this exam of 
females is far above that of males (29% versus 18.5%). These findings lend support to the 
notion that the learning environment aboard ships may be more conducive to males as once 
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White Black Hispanic Asian Other Total
SWO Fundamentals 82.1 74.7 77.2 81.5 80.2 81.0
Maritime Warfare 88.5 85.5 85.4 87.4 87.7 87.9
Rules-of-Road 92.0 87.5 90.0 91.2 91.2 91.4
Navigation 79.0 70.8 75.4 77.2 78.0 77.9
Final Exam 83.4 77.2 79.5 83.6 85.0 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 75.0% 9.4% 6.0% 6.2% 3.4% 100.0%
White Black Hispanic Asian Other Total
SWO Fundamentals 16.7% 45.5% 32.1% 20.6% 26.3% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 3.8% 10.5% 7.5% 8.4% 2.9% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 26.8% 46.4% 37.3% 30.1% 28.9% 29.5%
Navigation 24.6% 55.1% 40.0% 36.5% 21.6% 28.7%
Final Exam 5.6% 21.3% 25.0% 10.3% 14.3% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 75.0% 9.4% 6.0% 6.2% 3.4% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY AGE GROUP: (N = 2,223 )
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY ETHNICITY: (N = 2,223 )
Male Female Total Not Married Married Total
SWO Fundamentals 81.5 79.2 81.0 81.0 81.0 81.0
Maritime Warfare 87.8 88.1 87.9 88.0 87.6 87.9
Rules-of-Road 91.4 91.4 91.4 91.5 91.1 91.4
Navigation 78.4 76.3 77.9 78.7 76.1 77.9
Final Exam 82.4 83.2 82.6 83.0 81.8 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 67.2% 32.8% 100.0%
Male Female Total Not Married Married Total
SWO Fundamentals 18.5% 29.0% 20.9% 21.4% 19.9% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 4.9% 5.0% 4.9% 4.8% 5.1% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 29.7% 28.9% 29.5% 29.5% 29.6% 29.5%
Navigation 28.3% 30.0% 28.7% 26.1% 34.5% 28.7%
Final Exam 8.9% 7.8% 8.6% 6.6% 13.7% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 67.2% 32.8% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY GENDER: PERCENT FAIL  BY MARITAL STATUS:
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY GENDER: MEAN SCORE BY MARITAL STATUS:
TABLE 4. 



























female junior officers enter typical schoolhouse settings they seem to perform on par or above 
that of male officers. 
 Lastly, marital status (at the time of ASAT) is included as prior research (Bowman 
and Mehay (2000) has found support for the view that individuals choosing to get married are 
more motivated to perform due to the additional family responsibilities compared to those 
choosing to remain single (or divorced) and as such are more productive in the workplace. We 
see in Table 5 above little differences in test scores across the two marital status groups, but 
higher failure rates on the Navigation and Final exams. There is no meaningful justification for 
these latter differences, and may in fact reflect the possibility that other intervening factors 
correlated with marital status and ASAT performance may first have to be accounted for before 
one can obtain more meaningful relationships of marital status and schoolhouse performance. 
 
 2.  College Experience.  The second major group of explanatory variables specified in 
ASAT performance models include three aspects of college experience  – including the level of 
military training acquired prior to commissioning, the quality of college attended, and one‘s 
academic major.  
First, military training prior to commissioning is measured by commissioning source – 
those attending the Naval Academy are assumed to acquire the most prior military training as 
they live in a strict military environment 24-7 over four years including summer training 
programs, and are required to take additional professional development classes each semester 
enrolled. Next are NROTC graduates who take additional military specific classes, are required 
to take a summer training cruise prior to graduation, and are an active part of a ROTC unit on or 
near campus. Next come OCS graduates who, following graduation, attend OCS School at 
Newport for six months. While most surface warfare division officers are non-prior service 
commissioned officers, a relatively small proportion are comprised of prior service enlisted 
personnel who are chosen to attend one of the major three commissioning programs along with 
a small percentage of LDOs and CWOs chosen to become division officers but remain in the 
enlisted force. Some individuals with observed prior enlisted service are commissioned officers 
(e.g. Seaman to Admiral ―mustangs‖) and are classified as Enlisted Commissioning Programs 
(ECP), although others with prior service who graduate from the three major commissioning 
programs may not be accurately identified and as such measurement errors may be introduced 
into the data with the ECP specification. 
 In general, those commissioned following college graduation having greater exposure to 
military training would be expected to outperform others at ASAT. Accordingly, one would 
expect better performance at ASAT by Academy graduates followed by NROTC then OCS. 
Individuals with prior-service (ECP) should also do better than non-prior service graduates. 
Expectations of ASAT performance of non-commissioned officers relative to the control group of 
Academy graduates is somewhat ambiguous as their years of active duty navy experience (and 
some have acquired a college degree while on active duty) should result in higher performance 
on tests, but these individuals are also ones who chose to enlist directly out of high school 
rather than attending college and may not perform as well in classroom settings. 
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Naval Acad NROTC OCS ECPs LDO CWO TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 81.7 81.2 80.0 83.1 79.9 80.0 81.0
Maritime Warfare 88.4 88.2 88.1 88.8 85.8 83.4 87.9
Rules-of-Road 91.9 92.1 90.8 93.5 89.3 87.6 91.4
Navigation 80.8 78.9 77.0 79.1 65.3 65.3 77.9
Final Exam 83.8 83.0 81.3 83.3 NA 88.8 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 29.4% 27.0% 29.0% 5.0% 6.1% 3.4% 100.0%
Naval Acad NROTC OCS ECPs LDO CWO TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 19.3% 21.3% 23.8% 11.7% 20.6% 21.3% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 4.1% 4.5% 4.0% 1.0% 10.3% 14.3% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 28.4% 26.3% 32.8% 18.2% 36.8% 40.0% 29.5%
Navigation 17.9% 26.1% 31.8% 32.4% 70.7% 68.0% 28.7%
Final Exam 4.3% 9.4% 11.3% 9.1% NA 0.0% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 29.4% 27.0% 29.0% 5.0% 6.1% 3.4% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM:
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM:
 The observed differences in test scores and failure rates by commissioning program are 
shown above where results of Naval Academy graduates are highlighted. We notice marginal 
differences in test scores favoring expectations relative to levels of military training, and 
somewhat larger differences in failure rates on the navigation (18% versus 26% and 32%) and 
final (4% versus 9% and11%) exams across the three major commissioning programs. 
Similarly, prior-service graduates of these (ECP) programs have slightly higher test scores and 
lower failure rates on the first three exams (SWO Fundamentals, Maritime Warfare, and Rules-
of-Road) but not on the Navigation or Final exams. The observed outcomes for non- 
commissioned officers differs drastically from Academy graduates as they have lower scores 
and higher fail rates at ASAT, especially on the Navigation exam (roughly 70% fail compared to  
 
TABLE 6. 










18%). These findings suggest that individuals who forego college directly out of high school fare 
less well in the classroom training even after having many years of experience aboard ships. 
 
 The second form of college experience measured in regression models measures the 
academic quality of the undergraduate institution (i.e., Barrons Index of Colleges). It is assumed 
that colleges which are more selective attract and graduate individuals who may have greater 
cognitive ability and/or motivated to learn and as such should score better on ASAT exams and 
be less likely to fail an exam. The list of colleges listed by the Barrons Index is given below in 
Table 7. Earlier attempts in specifying this variable resulted in significant differences only at the 
tail ends of the seven stratifications thus the quality index reported in this report is collapsed into 
three categories – most competitive, competitive (the control group), and less/non-competitive. 
Schools of junior officers from the top category include most Ivy League colleges and highly 
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selective liberal arts colleges such as Notre Dame, William and Mary, Carleton College, and 
Amherst. It is interesting to note that most of these schools are not known for their technical 
majors (especially engineering) which is so highly regarded by many senior leaders in the navy. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the less competitive schools which include: smaller public 
state universities - such as San Francisco State, Cleveland State, and Kansas State 
Universities - and smaller private schools such as Grambling, St. Leo College, Luther College, 
and Spellman College. Nearly 90% of officers in the control group graduate from schools having 
moderate levels of selection and are mainly comprised of large well-known state universities 
such as: the Universities of Texas, North Carolina, Maryland, Missouri and San Diego State 
University. 
Observed ASAT outcomes related to college quality are shown below in Table 8. 
Relative to the control group of graduates from moderately competitive colleges, we see that 
graduates from the most (least) competitive schools have somewhat higher (lower) scores and 
are far less( more) likely to fail ASAT exams. These findings come at no surprise as it supports 
the notion that colleges with more selective standards graduate individuals who later will 




COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT
Notre Dame, Univ of 50 Carnegie Mellon Univ 19 Rice Univ 7 Princeton 2
Virginia, University of 43 Georgetown Univ 19 New York State Univ 4 Amherst College 1
Holy Cross, College of the 40 California at Berkeley, Univ of 18 Tufts Univ 4 California Institute of Technology 1
Cornell Univ 36 Duke Univ 18 Yale Univ 4 California, Univ of 1
Northwestern 29 M I T 13 Stanford 3 Carleton College 1
California at Los Angeles, Univ of 25 Harvard 12 William & Mary College 3 Colby College 1
Pennsylvania, Univ of 25 Columbia Univ 7 Emory University 2 Davidson College 1
COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT
Old Dominion Univ 137 Ohio State Univ 41 Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ 29 Drexel Univ 17
San Diego, Univ of 86 Boston University 40 Marquette Univ 29 Rochester Institute of Technology 17
Virginia Tech 82 Vanderbilt Univ 39 South Florida, Univ of 29 Florida A & M Univ 16
Penn State 77 Virginia Military Institute 39 Florida State Univ 26 Fordham Univ 14
Texas A & M 73 Idaho, Univ 38 Pittsburgh, Univ of 25 SUNY Brockport 14
Washington, Univ of 71 Maryland, Univ of 38 Morehouse College 23 Boston College 13
North Carolina State Univ 65 North Florida, Univ of 38 North Carolina Univ at Chapel Hill 23 California at San Diego, Univ of 13
Arizona, Univ of 62 Southern California, Univ of 38 Minnesota Univ 22 Illinois Institute of Technology 13
Jacksonville Univ 62 Excelsior College 36 Hawaii Pacific University 21 Merchant Marine Academy 13
The Citadel 60 Southern Illinois Univ 36 New Mexico, Univ of 21 Memphis Univ 12
Colorado, Univ of 55 Illinois, Univ of 35 Texas, Univ of 21 U S Coast Guard Academy 12
Purdue Univ 53 Michigan, Univ of 35 Oklahoma Univ 20 Worcester Polytechnic Institute 12
Villanova 53 South Carolina, Univ of 35 Wisconsin-Madison Univ 20 Houston, Univ of 11
Auburn Univ 51 San Diego State Univ 34 Mississippi, Univ of 19 National Univ 11
Oregon State 47 Missouri, Univ of 32 Nebraska Univ 19 New School Univ 11
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 47 Miami Univ 31 Phoenix, Univ of 19 U S Merchant Marine  Academy 11
Tulane Univ 47 Georgia Institute of Technology 30 Utah Univ 19 Eastern Michigan 10
George Washington Univ 45 Iowa State 30 Maine Maritime Academy 18 Louisiana State Univ 10
Florida, Univ of 43 Norfolk State Univ 30 Texas at Austin, Univ of 18 Maine Univ 9
Thomas Edison St Univ 43 Rochester, Univ of 30 USNA 18 Miami of Ohio 9
COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT COLLEGE COUNT
Norwich Univ 32 American Intercontinental Univ 2 Berry College 1 Inter American Univ 1
Prairie View A & M Univ 25 California State Univ, at Sacramento 2 Bluefield State College 1 Johnson & Wales University 1
Kansas, Univ of 23 Central Missouri St Univ 2 Briar Cliff Univ 1 Kansas State Univ 1
St. Leo College 19 Devery College 2 California at Bakersfield, Univ of 1 Kent State 1
Savannah State Univ 14 Devry University 2 California State Univ, at San Marcos 1 Langston Univ 1
Hampton University 12 Eastern Washington Univ 2 Clark Atlanta University 1 Limestone College 1
SUNY Maritime College 9 Grambling State Univ 2 Cleveland State Univ 1 Lipscpomb University 1
Wayland Baptist Univ 9 Marshall Univ 2 Columbus Univ 1 Livingstone College 1
Southern Univ 8 National Louis Univ 2 Crichton College 1 Louisville, Univ of 1
Georgia State Univ 7 Saint Leo University 2 Delaware State University 1 Lubbock Christian University 1
California Maritime Academy 6 San Francisco St Univ 2 Devry Univ 1 LUTHER COLLEGE 1
Park University 6 Texas at El Paso, Univ of 2 DeVry University 1 Mary Baldwin College 1
Hampton Roads 5 Texas at San Antonio, Univ of 2 Edwards University 1 Minot State University 1
Hawaii, Univ of 5 Univ of Louisiana at Monroe 2 Endicott College 1 Missouri Southern State College 1
New York Maritime College 4 Univ of PA, Edinboro 2 Ferris State University 1 Missouri State 1
Spelman College 4 Univ of Southern Indiana 2 Fort Hays State College 1 Northwestern State University 1
Clark Atlanta Univ 3 Alabama State Univ 1 Fort Valley State College 1 Oakland Univ 1
Liberty Univ 3 Alabama, Univ of North 1 Georgian Court Univ 1 Ottawa Univ 1
Montana State Univ 3 Alaska, Univ 1 Grantham Univ 1 Polytechnic Univ of Philippines 1
Akron, Univ of 2 Bay Path College 1 Indiana Wesleyan Univ 1 Robert Morris Univ 1






























SWO Fundamentals 84.8 81.2 76.2 81.0
Maritime Warfare 91.8 87.8 86.5 87.9
Rules-of-Road 94.7 91.4 89.5 91.4
Navigation 81.2 78.0 74.3 77.9
Final Exam 85.3 83.1 77.3 82.6







SWO Fundamentals 11.9% 20.0% 38.1% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 2.5% 5.0% 5.7% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 14.9% 29.8% 35.5% 29.5%
Navigation 19.0% 28.1% 43.1% 28.7%
Final Exam 9.5% 7.2% 20.4% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 4.5% 88.5% 7.0% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM:
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY COMMISSIONING PROGRAM:
TABLE 8. 











 The third aspect of college experience factor is one‘s undergraduate major, comprised of 
three technical majors (engineering/architecture, math/physical sciences, and biological 
sciences) and three non-technical majors (social sciences, humanities, and others including 
physical education, education, etc.). The navy prides itself on technical skills and as such one 
would expect those with technical majors to do better on exams designed by Surface Navy, 




















SWO Fundamentals 83.4 82.3 81.1 79.9 80.0 80.4 79.5 81.0
Maritime Warfare 89.6 88.7 89.1 87.1 87.9 87.5 84.8 87.9
Rules-of-Road 93.1 91.7 93.0 91.8 90.6 91.8 88.5 91.4
Navigation 81.8 78.9 77.9 78.6 76.3 80.4 69.0 77.9
Final Exam 85.0 83.6 82.9 81.9 82.2 80.3 79.6 82.6

















SWO Fundamentals 14.2% 18.5% 19.9% 24.4% 23.5% 23.5% 22.6% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 1.9% 3.8% 2.3% 4.6% 4.1% 8.0% 12.6% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 23.4% 29.6% 20.5% 26.9% 32.7% 30.2% 39.4% 29.5%
Navigation 15.1% 23.8% 34.4% 26.2% 33.7% 25.4% 55.4% 28.7%
Final Exam 4.8% 8.9% 6.3% 12.0% 8.5% 8.1% 15.0% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 17.8% 14.1% 6.5% 14.0% 30.0% 7.3% 10.2% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR:
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR:
TABLE 9. 












The largest percentage of commissioned officers are social science majors in college 
(30%) and these individuals are selected as the control group for this college experience 
variable. As seen in Table 9 below, of all technical majors, engineering majors are observed to 
achieve the highest ASAT scores and have the lowest fail rates, while the other technical majors 
outperform social science majors but not to the extent of engineers. ASAT performance of 
humanities majors is similar to that of social science majors although business/economics 
majors have slightly higher scores and lower failure rates on the Rules-of-Road and Navigation 
exams. Education, PE and other majors generally score lower and have higher fail rates on all 
ASAT exams with the exception of SWO Fundamentals than the control group. In general, these 
observed outcomes are what one might normally expect for classroom performance.2 
 
3.   Navy Assignments. The third major group of explanatory variables specified in 
regression models measure varying types of Surface Navy assignment polices, including: duty 
station, ship type, and Division Officer (DIVO) assignment by the ship‘s command.  
 Discussion with ships‘ crews during interviews collected in the qualitative portion of 
the project continually emphasized the role underway time plays in obtaining one‘s OOD/U and 
time to becoming warfare qualified. In addition, we were informed that certain duty stations such 
                                                          
2
 A recent study by the National Survey of Student Engagement (2011) reports that engineering majors study more 
than any other major – 19 hours per week while social science majors study the least (14 hours). It is possible that 
technical majors may have greater cognitive ability and motivation, while facing greater challenges than others. 
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as Japan have significantly greater underway time due to their joint operations with foreign 
navies. As such, differences in ASAT test scores are expected to vary across both ship types 
and duty stations due to varying underway time and scheduled repairs. 
Surface Navy ship and homeport assignments, however, are also affected by policies 
that reward academic and military performance in college, most notably for over half of all newly 
commissioned surface warfare officers from the Naval Academy (29%) and from NROTC 
graduates of civilian colleges (27%). The ―rack-and-stack‖ ranking system allows those with 
better grades to have first choice of ship types and duty stations. Favored ship types (e.g. major 
combatants, especially guided missile destroyers (DDGs with 40% of all JOs)) and duty station 
locations (e.g. Pearl Harbor and Japan) are typically the first choice among those standing at 
the top of their college class, leaving those closer to the bottom of the scholarship programs 
having to select less desired ships (often amphibious ships) and all ship types based in Norfolk 
(accounting for over one-third of all JOs).  
ASAT outcomes by duty station and ship type are shown below in Table 10 where 
destroyers and Norfolk are the relevant control groups specified later in regressions. As 
expected, ASAT exam scores tend to be higher (lower) and failure rates lower (higher) in most 
duty stations (ship types) compared to Norfolk (DDGs).These results support the view that these 
two forms of Surface Navy selection may well act as a proxy for academic and military 
performance during college years.  Individuals selecting Norfolk as their duty station generally 
have lower ASAT test scores and higher failure rates than other homeport assignments. Other 
test results differ among the various duty stations, but no single homeport appears to distinguish 
itself from the others regarding ASAT performance. 
 
The third assignment policy is that of the Division Officer Department aboard a ship. 
Since all junior officers are required to pass necessary PQS qualifications as part of their early 
training program before warfare qualification, one might not expect department assignment to 
be meaningfully related to performance on ASAT exams. Two exceptions to this view, however, 
were uncovered during the qualitative interviews. First, some Chief Petty Officer (CPO) billets 
remain gapped when newly commissioned officers are assigned to a particular division resulting 






Japan-Guam Norfolk FL-TX-MI TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 82.3 81.4 81.9 81.3 79.6 82.4 81.0
Maritime Warfare 89.9 88.5 88.5 88.0 86.8 88.3 87.9
Rules-of-Road 92.6 91.5 92.6 91.7 90.3 92.6 91.4
Navigation 78.1 78.5 82.1 76.8 76.4 79.4 77.9
Final Exam 84.1 83.5 84.3 80.8 82.3 81.6 82.6




Japan-Guam Norfolk FL-TX-MI TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 16.7% 19.8% 16.8% 21.8% 24.9% 15.1% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 0.0% 4.6% 3.5% 4.2% 6.6% 3.7% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 21.8% 28.1% 19.5% 29.2% 34.9% 26.0% 29.5%
Navigation 29.4% 26.1% 17.2% 31.7% 33.7% 24.6% 28.7%
Final Exam 6.7% 8.1% 7.1% 10.8% 9.1% 7.1% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 3.5% 30.0% 6.9% 11.6% 35.2% 12.8% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY DUTY STATION:
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY DUTY STATION:
Frigates Destroyers Cruisers Amphibs Other TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 81.0 82.2 81.2 78.8 80.3 81.0
Maritime Warfare 87.4 89.5 88.4 86.0 85.1 87.9
Rules-of-Road 91.5 91.7 91.4 90.7 91.5 91.4
Navigation 79.2 79.5 73.6 78.3 71.5 77.9
Final Exam 82.0 83.2 82.9 82.3 79.4 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 14.4% 41.1% 14.9% 23.2% 6.4% 100.0%
Frigates Destroyers Cruisers Amphibs Other TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 19.1% 16.4% 18.2% 30.3% 25.7% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 4.1% 3.1% 1.9% 8.8% 9.9% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 28.2% 28.7% 29.0% 32.8% 27.1% 29.5%
Navigation 22.7% 24.5% 40.7% 27.6% 52.9% 28.7%
Final Exam 5.7% 8.7% 8.3% 7.3% 21.7% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 14.4% 41.1% 14.9% 23.2% 6.4% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY SHIP TYPE:
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY SHIP TYPE:
TABLE 10. 
Duty Station, ShipType & ASAT Performance 
 
























directed more to their job as a division leader, they have less time to devote to getting all PQS 
qualifications and less time to study in preparation for ASAT. Since this information is lacking in 
the data, it is not possible to quantify this important factor in all regressions. However, another 
facet was specified in the data and that is the department assignment called ―Other‖ 
(encompassing various Executive and Administrative job titles). This department is assigned to 
those newly reporting junior officers not given a specific major department such as Weapons, 
Combat Systems, Engineering and the like. In essence, these junior officers are not under the 
major guidance of a specific Department Head or CPO. While one would surmise that these 
officers have additional time to obtain their PQS qualifications and have more time to prepare 
for ASAT exams – and thus do better at ASAT – we also uncovered a countervailing force 
affecting one‘s motivation to learn. In particular, junior officers not assigned to a major 
department felt relatively useless and uncared for. They simply seemed far less motivated as 
they felt among ‗the forgotten.‘ This was especially noticeable among Frigates (FFGs), which 
are to be decommissioned in the near future and have large numbers of unassigned junior 
officers. While we did uncover instances of ‗cross-decking‘ that could offset this de-motivational 
aspect, we believe that cross-decking was relatively atypical and far from the norm. As such, it 
is difficult to ascertain whether or not department assignment has a net positive or negative 
influence on ASAT exams. 
 Those assigned to the Weapons Department (17% of the total) will act as the control 
group in regression specifications. As indicated in Table 11 below, ASAT test scores and exam 
fail rates, in general, suggests that there are no large differentials in ASAT performance across 
shipboard department assignments– with the exception of those assigned to jobs classified as 
―other.‖ As explained earlier, these ―unassigned‖ officers don‘t have full division officer 
responsibilities and while one would expect them to have more time to prepare for ASAT, may 
in fact have less guidance and support than other junior officers with major DIVO 
responsibilities. In addition, they may be less motivated to learn if they do not feel they are a 
contributing and valuable Wardroom asset. 
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Combat Systems Operations Weapons Engineering Navigation Other TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 82.0 81.3 82.0 80.2 82.4 78.2 81.0
Maritime Warfare 87.9 88.5 90.6 86.8 89.8 85.0 87.9
Rules-of-Road 91.8 91.2 92.3 91.5 92.5 89.3 91.4
Navigation 79.2 77.8 78.5 77.3 82.7 76.7 77.9
Final Exam 82.6 83.2 83.1 82.9 79.8 78.9 82.6
% DISTRIBUTION 18.2% 25.8% 17.4% 28.2% 0.6% 9.8% 100.0%
Combat Systems Operations Weapons Engineering Navigation Other TOTAL
SWO Fundamentals 15.1% 18.5% 17.3% 24.7% 7.7% 34.4% 20.9%
Maritime Warfare 3.7% 3.3% 0.7% 7.6% 0.0% 10.5% 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 26.0% 32.0% 25.6% 29.3% 30.8% 37.2% 29.5%
Navigation 23.6% 31.3% 25.6% 30.2% 33.3% 31.6% 28.7%
Final Exam 11.1% 7.3% 8.1% 7.7% 25.0% 10.8% 8.6%
% DISTRIBUTION 18.2% 25.8% 17.4% 28.2% 0.6% 9.8% 100.0%
ASAT TEST
PERCENT FAIL BY DEPARTMENT ASSIGNMENT:
ASAT TEST
MEAN SCORE BY DEPARTMENT ASSIGNMENT:
TABLE 11. 














Empirical Results of Modeling ASAT Performance 
 
Multiple Regression Methodology of Study 
 
The influence of the three major groups of variables discussed above on performance in 
the ASAT schoolhouse portion of junior surface warfare officer training is depicted below in 
Figure 5. As mentioned earlier, knowledge acquired by one‘s completing the OOD/U 
qualification is crucial to one‘s performance during ASAT. This is depicted in the figure by the 
dashed lines relating the three major groups of explanatory variables directly affecting the 
acquisition of OOD/U. Individuals who are depicted as having greater stocks of human capital 
(i.e., have attended better schools and colleges, who have greater cognitive ability) and who are 
attached to favored duty stations and ship types are more likely to obtain their OOD/U 
qualification. This in turn has a direct affect on performance at ASAT. While these three major 
groups of factors affect OOD/U qualification, they also have a ―direct‖ effect (i.e., aside from 
becoming qualified OOD/U or not) on ASAT performance, indicated in the figure by four solid 
lines for these relationships.  
If we were to exclude OOD/U qualification as an explanatory factor, we would obtain 
what is known as the ―total effect‖ of an explanatory factor on ASAT performance – including the 
―direct‖ effect (shown by the solid lines connecting the major groups to ASAT) plus dashed lines 
from the three major groups to OOD/U). The approach taken in the project is to explicitly 
account for OOD/U as a separate and independent factor on ASAT performance, resulting in 
estimating the ―direct‖ effect of demographics and college and navy experience on exam scores 
and the likelihood of failing an ASAT exam.3 The objective of multivariate regression analysis is 
to provide the best estimates of each separate ―direct‖ effect on ASAT performance – controlling 
for all other measured factors included in the research design.4  
This regression approach used to analyze ASAT performance differs significantly from 
the more simple approach used above in describing bivariate relationships. The difference can 
                                                          
3
 While not shown in the Appendix, models specifying ―total‖ effects, with results indicating that only a small 
fraction of the total effect is composed of the estimated ―indirect‖ effect via OOD/U qualification. This finding 
suggests that the three major factors, while affecting OOD/U qualification, have a strong and separate effect on 
ASAT performance and the ―direct‖ effect estimates shown in the paper are unbiased estimates unaffected by the 
endogeneity of specifying OOD/U as another explanatory variable when modeling ASAT performance. 
4
 The qualitative portion of the project uncovered major explanatory factors of ASAT performance that we were 
unable to measure and include in the quantitative portion. For example, motivation to do well on ASAT exams was 
not uniform across the sample as the attitude of the importance of ASAT varied so dramatically across all ships at all 
duty stations surveyed. Some junior officers were under the impression that it was not necessary or important to use 
the provided CDs or take the exams included in the disks. These impressions were instilled by the training 
leadership existing on each ship as well as inherent to the individual junior officer. Some ships encouraged junior 
officers to study, if not cram, for ASAT and these junior officers reported that they did better than those who did not 
prepare. Many of the empirical findings seem to support if not suggest that individual motivation is the key factor to 
ASAT performance and that the motivation does not appear to be highly correlated with many human capital factors 
specified in the regression model. These and other findings are discussed below. 
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best be explained by an example. Consider the relationship between a single intervening factor, 
say commissioning program, and failure rates on the Navigation exam. As seen earlier, 
Academy graduates are far less likely to fail this exam (18% versus 26% NROTC and 32% 
OCS) when looking at a simple two-way relationship. We will find, however, when we control for 
many other individual characteristics (major, quality of college, and duty station-ship 




FLOW DIAGRAM OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL OF ASAT PERFORMANCE 
DEMOGRAPHICS: 
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Naval Academy military lifestyle immersion experience has no statistically significant difference. 
That is, regression models attempt to replicate a random experiment whereby commission 
program selection were the result of a flip of the coin. If this were done, than any differences 
that would occur later in a classroom setting such as ASAT could be attributed to college 
experience at the Naval Academy compared to another commissioning source. In essence, we 
try to account for all the measurable differences of newly commissioned officers and strip off the 
unique, individual impact of one of these intervening factors. As such, multiple regression 
modeling may well result in differing outcomes than what we tend to observe in practice. 
Sometimes the impact of an intervening factor may differ in direction or more often the case 
may be to lessen or exaggerate the observed impacts we observe in everyday life. The reason 
there may be such differences is due to more complex interrelationships among the factors 
themselves. Regression analysis holds these interrelations constant and thus often produces far 
different results than observed. Given the available quantitative data, the following section 
presents the best estimates of each individual measurable factor on OOD/U qualification and 
later ASAT exam performance. 
OOD/U Qualification. 
 
 The full regression model of whether or not an individual obtains the OOD/U qualification 
prior to attending the ASAT schoolhouse training program includes a host of explanatory 
factors, including: individual characteristics (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, and marital status), pre-
commissioning schooling and military indoctrination (i.e., commissioning source, college quality, 
and academic majors), as well as post-commissioning Navy homeport, ship, and division 
assignments. The full model specification results are shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A, while 
Table 12 below shows only the estimated marginal effects that are found to be statistically 
significant, once all explanatory factors are specified in the multiple regression model. 
 
 As explained earlier, the requirement of obtaining one‘s OOD/U qualification prior to 
attending ASAT was eliminated in March 2009 with Class 239. The last class with available data 
for statistical analysis was that for Class 273 convening in June 2001, resulting in 1,179 
individuals with complete data out of a total of 1,211 who were enrolled during this period. 
During this period we observe average rates of OOD/U attainment over the three-year period 
gradually falling from 63.5% in 2009 to 54.0% in 2010, and down to 36.5% for the first half of 
2011.  During this period and average of 54.2% of ASAT enrollees had attained their OOD/U 
qualification prior to attending ASAT. 
 As shown below in Table 12, six explanatory variables are found to be significantly 
related to attaining one‘s OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT, after specifying all other observed 
factors in the fully specified model (shown as Table A.1 in Appendix A). Two pre-commissioning 
factors – ethnicity and commissioning source – are found to be negatively related to the 
probability of OOD/U attainment. Specifically, African-Americans are 8.4% less likely to have 
their OOD/U qualification than Whites while graduates of O.C.S. are 5.8% less likely to have 
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their OOD/U qualification than Naval Academy graduates, regardless of the quality of civilian 
college attended. These two findings are important to the study in pointing out that there may be 
groups of officers who, on average, may need to more closely mentored during their early on-
board training if they are to earn this important seaboard qualification, which in turn may well 
help them during later schoolhouse training programs. 
 The model also indicates how early navy assignment policies may affect the timing of 
OOD/U qualification. In particular, we find individuals assigned to amphibious ships are 7.4% 
less likely to attain OOD/U prior to ASAT than those assigned to DDGs, while those on small 
ships are 11.8% more likely to obtain the qualification before attending ASAT. The actual reason 
for these findings are left to speculation, and information gleaned from the focus group  
Table 12. 
Estimated Impacts of Explanatory Factors on 











Ethnicity African-American White -8.4% 
Commissioning Source O.C.S Naval Academy -5.8% 
Grade Ensign Chief Warrant Officer +22.5% 
Ship Type Amphibious Ship Guided Missile Destroyer -7.4% 
 Small Ships Guided Missile Destroyer +11.8% 
Homeport Far East Norfolk +15.2% 
 
discussion sessions carried out in the study suggests the following. First, ship selection is not a 
random assignment process but highly driven by academic and military performance of 
commissioned officers during their college years of experience. While cruiser-destroyers are 
usually at the top of the wish list of selectees, it is typically thought that those with lower college 
standings as having to choose what remains on the selection board – mostly amphibious ships. 
In addition, it was pointed out that the training environments aboard these ships are not 
centered on surface warfare qualifications to the extent they are aboard CRUDES ships. Both of 
these factors could well explain why Division Officers aboard these ship types are less likely to 
qualify OOD/U prior to ASAT. However, the positive finding for those selecting small ships 
(which account for a relatively small percentage of Division Officers) were attributed to the 
general belief that junior officers aboard these ships have greater shipboard responsibilities 
owing to the small number of officers and greater time underway. 
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 Similar explanations for the finding that Division Officers assigned to ships stationed in 
Japan and Guam may account for the finding that those assigned to these homeports are 
15.2% more likely to qualify OOD/U prior to  ASAT than those assigned to Norfolk. In particular, 
focus group discussions generally felt that these ships were operating with foreign navies in a 
higher operations tempo than ships assigned elsewhere. Shipboard personnel, regardless of 
their rank (from the Chief‘s Mess to Commanding Officers), all stressed the positive relationship 
to time underway and obtaining one‘s OOD/U – and ships assigned to these Far East ports 
were simply underway more often and for longer periods of time. 
 In summary, the model of OOD/U qualification shows many interesting and important 
reasons of why individuals may or may not obtain this important shipboard qualification prior to 
attending ASAT. Given the fact that the Navy has allowed a greater and greater portion of its 
junior officers to attend ASAT without having this qualification, it surely impacts severely on the 
breadth and depth of information covered n the ―advanced shipboard and training‖ curriculum 
offered in this crucial early surface warfare officer training pipeline. Focus group discussions 
pointed out two impacts this has had on their perspective of ASAT. First, those having gone 
through ASAT with their OOD/U felt they were at an advantage in learning the material being 
taught, while second they felt that the curriculum seemed to be changed to focus more on things 
they already knew since they possessed the skills required in passing the OOD/U qualification. 
These findings strongly support the re-institution of making OOD/U qualification a requirement 
for ASAT attendance. Not only will junior officers be better positioned to learn material 
presented in ASAT, but the information contained in the curriculum may be designed and 
delivered at a higher level of learning. 
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Models of ASAT Performance 
 
 We next turn our attention to the major statistical models explaining individual 
performance during the ASAT schoolhouse training program. We focus our attention on the 
estimated impact of each major explanatory variable – while holding the impact of all other 
factors constant – on each of five major ASAT exams: SWO Fundamentals, Maritime Warfare, 
Rules-of-Road, Navigation, and a Final Exam. As explained above, only the first has been 
continuously administered over all relevant classes, while the others have selectively been 
administered. We present findings in the text of only those factors that are statistically significant 
and important significant findings are discussed in the text. One may find all estimated ‗marginal 
effects‘ (i.e., differences from the average) of the completely specified models in Appendix A. 
 The discussion below is organized into four major explanatory variable groups. The first 
is possession of OOD/U qualification, which we model as having a direct impact on ASAT 
performance. We then turn our attention to three groups of explanatory factors discussed 




 As explained above, regression models are specified for OOD/U qualification separate 
from performance at ASAT. This approach strongly supports the view that Surface Navy should 
reinstitute the policy of requiring this important PQS qualification so that the ―leveling 
experience‖ can be more uniform and the material covered during ASAT can be taught at a 
more in-depth and higher level than is currently the case. This view also supports that of many 
senior leaders interviewed aboard navy ships that the perceived benefits of acquiring the 
surface warfare pin in a pre-determined constrained amount of time is not worth its cost in terms 
of giving each junior officer sufficient time and opportunity to truly understand and become 
operationally proficient in the myriad of PQS requirements that must be obtained prior to 

























SWO Fundamentals 80.0 1.6 2.0% 24.7 -6.30 -25.5%
Maritime Warfare 86.9 1.7 2.0% 7.0 -3.9 -55.7%
Rules-of-Road 90.3 2.1 2.3% 35.7 -11.5 -32.2%
Navigation 77.0 1.6 2.1% 29.5 0.0%
Final Exam 81.8 2.5 3.1% 10.60 -5.5 -51.9%
OOD/U QUALIFIED OOD/U QUALIFIED
EXAM
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ASAT EXAM RESULTS: OOD/U Qualification Before ASAT
PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
TABLE 13. 








  *The full model specification is shown below in Table A.11 of Appendix A.  
 
The independent ―direct‖ effect of OOD/U qualification on performance at ASAT is 
shown above in Table 13. It must be emphasized that these estimates are produced from 
multiple regression models that control for all other explanatory factors and are the best 
estimates of how OOD/U qualification itself affects ASAT performance given individual 
demographics and college experiences as well as navy assignment policies. The estimated 
OOD/U impacts on variations in the ASAT scores are all statistically significant but one may not 
fully understand how meaningful these differences are given the relatively small numerical size 
of the coefficients. To better appreciate the impact of OOD/U we also show the estimated direct 
impacts of acquiring the OOD/U qualification on the probability that a junior officer will fail an 
ASAT exam. The results indicate that the impact is statistically significant for all but the recently 
administered Navigation exam, and having strong and meaningful impacts on the other four 
exams. For example, we estimate that 18.4% of those OOD/U qualified are expected to fail the 
SWO Fundamentals exam compared to the 24.7% failure rate of those not having this 
qualification prior to ASAT (i.e., the estimated delta is -6.3% points, which translates into a 26% 
lower failure rate). The largest proportional impact is on the Maritime Warfare exam (that is no 
longer administered) and the recently instituted Final exam. Here we find having an OOD/U 
qualification can reduce the likelihood of failing by over 50% on these two exams. These results 






 Since there are so many varied ASAT exams analyzed, the approach taken here is to 
summarize the most important estimated independent effects of each contributing factor to 
performance at ASAT and acquiring OOD/U qualification prior to attending ASAT. As noted 
above, results are categorized by the three major groups of explanatory variables – 
demographics, college experience, and navy experience.5 
 
  Demographics 
  
The estimated ―direct‖ impact of demographic variables of age, ethnicity, gender and 
marital status on ASAT performance and acquiring the OOD/U qualification are shown below in 
Tables 14-15. 
Age.  As indicated in Panel (A) of Table 14, age is generally not related to OOD/U 
qualification except for relatively older junior officers (30+) - mostly are CWOs and attend ASAT 
on a voluntary basis – who qualify six months later than the average (18 months). Age, when 
statistically significant, is inversely related to ASAT performance where we observe those older 
than 23 having lower exam scores and are more likely to fail an exam than the 22-23 aged 
control group. For example, those 24-29 achieve lower Navigation exam scores and 28.4% are 
expected to fail the exam (i.e., the estimated rate of failure is 7.8% points greater than those 
aged 22-23 (20.6%) in the control group. To put all estimated changes on the same scale, we 
transform the point estimates to proportional changes (i.e., the difference as a percentage of the 
average) which for the age related difference transforms the +7.8% point differential into a 38% 
proportional increase in failure rates. Even higher failure rates are expected of those 30 and 
older (i.e., a 22% point increase and 107% greater failure rate) compared to those 22-23.. 
 Two additional observations may be pointed out from these age related findings that are 
indicative of regression modeling in general. First, observed differences in exam performance 
may be non-zero, but the difference is just as likely to be due to chance (we only observe a 
sample of individuals at any point in time) as due to the contributing factor like age. Regression 
models provide the decision-maker with the knowledge, based on strong statistical grounds, 
whether or not to attribute any observed differences to a causal relationship. For example, 
26.3% of individuals who are 20-21 years old are observed to fail the Navigation exam as 
compared to the control group aged 22-23, resulting in an observed 5.7% point difference. (See 
Table 3 above for these observed statistics.) However, multiple regression analysis, which 
controls for other factors and takes into account the distribution of failure rates between any two 
age cohorts, finds the estimated direct effect to be ―statistically insignificant.‖ That is, one should 
                                                          
5
 The full model specifications showing all estimated coefficients and the level of significance for ASAT 
























20-21 1.8 2.2% 20-21
24-29 24-29
30+ 30+
20-21 2.2 2.5% 20-21
24-29 24-29
30+ -2.5 -2.8% 30+




24-29 -1.9 -2.4% 24-29 7.8 37.9%
30+ -7.0 -8.8% 30+ 22.0 106.8%
20-21 20-21
24-29 -1.8 -2.2% 24-29















































PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
88.3
discount the observed difference due to age as a statistical artifact rather than a causal 
relationship for the population of junior surface warfare officers. 
   
TABLE 14. 






































Black -5.9 -7.2% Black 24.4 146.1%
Hispanic -4.1 -5.0% Hispanic 12.4 74.3%
Asian -8.7 -10.6% Asian
Other Other 8.5 50.9%
Black -1.6 -1.8% Black 4.6 121.1%
Hispanic -2.1 -2.4% Hispanic
Asian -1.5 -1.7% Asian 4.7 123.7%
Other Other 
Black -3.3 -3.6% Black 15.1 56.3%
Hispanic -1.7 -1.8% Hispanic 9.6 35.8%
Asian Asian
Other Other 
Black -4.9 -6.2% Black 22.1 89.8%
Hispanic Hispanic 11 44.7%
Asian Asian 12.6 51.2%
Other Other 
Black -4.2 -5.0% Black 13.4 239.3%





































PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
88.5
EXAM




























The second feature of regression analysis is that the observed difference, even when it 
is statistically significant, may differ widely from the estimated impact that controls for other 
intervening factors. This may be best exemplified by comparing observed Navigation failure 
rates of individuals 30+ as compared to the control group aged 22-23. From Table 3, we find 
63.7% of older officers fail the Navigation exam compared to 20.6% of those aged 22-23 - a 
stunning 43.1% point difference. Regression models, however, predict a much smaller 
difference. Although the estimated difference is statistically significant, when one holds other 
factors constant, we find the estimated difference to be 22.0% points higher – roughly one-half 
of the difference observed. 
It is for these two reasons that one builds complex regression models. First, we want to 
be assured that when we do observe differences, they are most likely due to a (theoretically 
based) causal relationship rather than an association that may be merely due to chance. 
Secondly, we want to know what is the independent impact of a single causal factor on an  
outcome of choice, once we ‗hold constant‘ other possible interrelated impacts other factors 
may have on an outcome. 
 To summarize, the take-away from investigating the impact of age on ASAT 
performance is that one should make older officers (mainly LDOs and especially CWOs) aware 
that they may expect to face a serious challenge when enrolling in ASAT, and perhaps special 
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resources and/or time may be required to increase their chances of success in this schoolhouse 
training program. 
 
 Ethnicity.  Regression results shown in Panel (B) of Table 14 above strongly support the 
view that racial minorities on average, may be seriously challenged in the ASAT schoolhouse 
training program. While African-American officers are the only racial minority to be less likely to 
obtain their OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT compared to white officers (-15.3%), most 
minorities are likely to achieve lower scores and higher failure rates on various ASAT exams. 
For example, African-American officers, holding all else constant, are expected to experience 
exam failure rates from 50% to over 200% higher than that of white officers, while Hispanics 
may experience 30% to 300% higher failure rates. Knowledge and awareness of these findings 
is crucial to minority officers becoming more successful at ASAT. Training officers and senior 
leadership aboard ships need to ensure those who are most likely to face difficulties in the 
schoolhouse training program find time and guidance on how to better prepare themselves for 
ASAT. As noted earlier, our interviews with division officers – especially those who experienced 
―SWOS-in-the-Box‖ – many times noted how important the CDs were in helping them better 
understand material directly related to PQS qualifications and material covered in the ASAT 
classes. These findings suggest that senior leadership at sea reinforce the importance of these 
CDs with regularly scheduled onboard tests based on this medium. In addition, special ‗gouge 
sessions‘ may be urged to take place prior to ASAT for those deemed more likely to face 
challenges during ASAT. 
 
  
 Gender.  Results displayed in Table 15 below indicate the role gender plays in early 
junior surface warfare officer training is for the most part without concern. We find female 
OOD/U qualification rates prior to ASAT and test scores and failure rates covering material 
presented during ASAT to be similar to that of their male counterparts. The only exception, that 
is quite strong, is that females are 60% more likely to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam 
administered at the very beginning of ASAT than males. Since this finding was first identified in 
an earlier report (Bowman and Crawford, 2009), we tried to uncover what, if any, factors could 
be identified to explain this disparity. No one, regardless of grade or rating, seemed to be aware 
of this outcome and the best one can surmise is that an implicit characteristic of ―wardroom 
culture‖ might be more conducive to learning and sharing information among males compared 
with females, for once females come to ASAT, their performance covering material presented is 
no different than the average male performance. It is also interesting to point out that female 
OOD/U qualification rates do not differ from males, suggesting that shipboard environments 
don‘t negatively affect explicit navy expectations and requirements, but nevertheless may have 
negative impacts on implicit learning and sharing of information that lie beneath the surface of 

























SWO Fundamentals 81.5 -2.8 -3.4% 18.5% 11.5 62.2%
Maritime Warfare 87.8 4.9%
Rules-of-Road 91.4 29.7%
Navigation 78.4 -3.6 -4.6% 28.3%
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SWO Fundamentals 81.0 21.4%
Maritime Warfare 88.0 0.9 1.0% 4.8%
Rules-of-Road 91.5 0.8 0.9% 29.5% -4.8 -16.3%
Navigation 78.7 26.1%
























Officer of the 
Deck/Underway
53.3% MARRIED 17.9 MARRIED 4.3 24.0%
EXAM
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ASAT EXAM RESULTS: Gender
EXAM
PERCENT QUALIFIED OOD/U: MONTHS TO QUALIFY IF OODU QUALIFIED:
EXAM
PERCENT QUALIFIED OOD/U: MONTHS TO QUALIFY IF OODU QUALIFIED:
PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
MARRIED MARRIED
FEMALE FEMALE
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ASAT EXAM RESULTS: Marital Status
EXAM
EXAM SCORE: PERCENT FAIL EXAM:
 Marital Status.  Estimated impacts of marital status on ASAT performance are shown in 
Table 15 below. The results are relatively mixed. For example, while married officers are no 
more or less likely to qualify OOD/U than those not married (mostly single) those that do qualify 
seem to take somewhat longer to qualify. At ASAT, the performance or married officers differs 
only in being less likely to fail the Rules-of-Road exam (-16%), but more likely to fail the recently 
administered Final exam (+77%) than that of single officers. In general, these results do not 
show any consistent pattern and give us little reason to suspect that married officers are 
somehow more motivated or more productive as has been found previously. 
 
TABLE 15. 
Regression Estimates of Gender & Marital Status  

















 College Experience 
 
 As discussed above, the regression model includes three factors when explaining the 
impact of college experience on the early training of Division Officers prior to being fully warfare 
qualified, including: commissioning program, college quality, and undergraduate major 
selection. 
 Commissioning Program and College Quality.  To better understand the impact of 
commissioning program on the early training of surface warfare junior officers, the report 
interacts commissioning program (e.g., Naval Academy, NROTC, and OCS) with college 

























O.C.S. -1.2 -1.5% O.C.S.
E.C.P. 1.8 2.2% E.C.P.
Most Competitive 3.3 4.0% Most Competitive
Least Competitive -3.1 -3.8% Least Competitive 11.3 58.2%
Limited Duty Officer Limited Duty Officer




Most Competitive 3.3 3.7% Most Competitive
Least Competitive Least Competitive
Limited Duty Officer Limited Duty Officer
Chief Warrant Officer -2.2 -2.5% Chief Warrant Officer 6.9 164.3%
N.R.O.T.C. N.R.O.T.C.
O.C.S. O.C.S.
E.C.P. 2.1 2.3% E.C.P. -12.6 -45.0%
Most Competitive 3.1 3.4% Most Competitive -13.5 -48.2%
Least Competitive Least Competitive
Limited Duty Officer 2.7 2.9% Limited Duty Officer
Chief Warrant Officer -4.0 -4.4% Chief Warrant Officer
N.R.O.T.C. -2.3 -2.9% N.R.O.T.C.
O.C.S. -2.7 -3.3% O.C.S.
E.C.P. 0.0% E.C.P. -12.6 -67.7%
Most Competitive 3.1 3.8% Most Competitive -13.5 -72.6%
Least Competitive 0.0% Least Competitive
Limited Duty Officer 2.7 3.3% Limited Duty Officer




Most Competitive Most Competitive
Least Competitive -3.6 -4.3% Least Competitive 7.4 164.4%
Limited Duty Officer Limited Duty Officer

























O.C.S. -5.8 -10.3% O.C.S.
E.C.P. E.C.P.
Most Competitive Most Competitive
Least Competitive Least Competitive
Limited Duty Officer Limited Duty Officer
Chief Warrant Officer Chief Warrant Officer
EXAM
PERCENT QUALIFIED OOD/U: MONTHS TO QUALIFY IF OODU QUALIFIED:
Final Exam 4.583.7
EXAM




PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
56.3% 18.5






























acquired at the Naval Academy, since it is among the most selective colleges in the country, 
combines two interrelated aspects of college experience. First, it provides a round-the-clock 
military lifestyle twelve months a year for four years. Second, midshipmen selected from high 
school applicants typically come from the top 20% of their high school class and have combined 
58 
 
SAT scores in excess of 1200. To make more accurate comparisons of college graduates, we 
separate NROTC and OCS graduates into those coming from schools comparable to that of the 
Naval Academy (―most competitive‖) versus two other groups including the 90% who comprise 
the control group from moderately selective civilian colleges and those at the bottom end of 
college quality (―less/non competitive‖) spectrum.  
 The estimated impacts on ASAT performance of NROTC and OCS graduates from 
moderately selective colleges compared with Naval Academy graduates are listed under the 
main headings of NROTC and OCS. But to obtain the results of NROTC or OCS graduates of 
most or least selective schools, one must add the above coefficients on NROTC or OCS 
variables to those of the most or least competitive college variables. As an example, we notice 
that the OCS graduate of moderately competitive colleges is 5.8% less likely to qualify OOD/U 
than Academy graduates (56.3%), but there are no additional differences found among OCS 
graduates who came from highly selective or non-selective compared to OCS graduates from 
competitive colleges (i.e., these coefficients are statistically insignificant and not reported in the 
table). In essence, all OCS graduates – regardless of college selectivity – face significant 
challenges to becoming OOD/U qualified prior to ASAT. Once again, our interviews with the 
fleet uncovered repeated experiences of OCS graduates lamenting the fact that the first time 
they ever set foot aboard a ship was the day they reported to duty after INTRO training. They 
literally didn‘t know fore from aft. The results of this report strongly support the notion that the 
scholarship graduates of the Naval Academy and NROTC have an edge up on those coming 
right out of OCS and from the very start of their careers, OCS graduates are at a disadvantage 
that has not yet been made up during the early training programs for surface warfare officers. 
 Next, we see from Table 16 that commissioning program and college quality seem to 
affect ASAT performance but their independent impacts differ by types of exams. Quite 
surprisingly, NROTC and OCS graduates from moderately or most competitive colleges do no 
worse or better than Academy graduates on the SWO Fundamentals exam, but only graduates 
from less/non competitive colleges are nearly 60% more likely to fail this exam covering material 
they should have learned during their first 18-20 months aboard ships. There are three 
interesting conclusions one can draw from this finding. First, while OCS graduates on average 
may not acquire the needed skills to become OOD/U qualified like Academy and NROTC 
graduates, only those graduating from less selective colleges face serious challenges to 
learning basic knowledge required for junior surface warfare fundamentals. In essence, navy 
officer recruiters should have incentives to fill their desired quotas from moderately or highly 
selective civilian colleges and minimize their efforts of recruiting at less/non-selective colleges .  
The second interesting outcome is implicit in finding no statistical differences in failure 
rates on the ASAT exams between OCS graduates of most competitive or even moderately 
competitive colleges compared to Naval Academy graduates who have been immersed in four 
years of military training at a most selective college.  
Thirdly, differences between these groups, when significant, are attributed to the 
selectivity of the college rather than the military training received at the college. For example, 
graduates of most competitive civilian colleges are almost 50% less likely to fail the Rules-of-
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Road and Navigation exam than Academy graduates. Apparently ASAT exams are construed in 
such a way that either pre-commissioning military training is only marginally related or  
graduates with prior military training in college are less motivated to take and pass these 
exams.6 
 Another interesting finding reported in the table shows prior-service commissioned 
officers to be 45% less likely to fail the Rules-of-Road and Navigation exams than college 
graduates not having prior enlisted service. The only significant differences found among non-
commissioned officers are that CWOs are 37% less likely to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam 
but over 150% more likely to fail the Maritime Warfare exam. One possible explanation for these 
findings is that more senior enlisted personnel understand better the basic fundamental skills 
required of a Division Officer, but do not excel in learning maritime strategy in a classroom 
setting. 
 
 Undergraduate Major.  Regression modeling results shown in Table 17 are interesting in 
showing what, if any, relationships can be supported between ASAT performance and one‘s 
undergraduate major. The first thing to notice in this regard is the lack of relationship between 
one‘s undergraduate major, either technical or non-technical, and one‘s propensity to acquire 
OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT, other than the fact it takes non-engineering technical majors 
longer to acquire this qualification than social science major
                                                          
6
 Interviews carried out onboard ships did uncover at times an attitude, especially among Academy graduates, that 
they had learned much of this material once before and didn’t see great value in relearning the material that may 
























Engineering 2.8 3.5% Engineering -6.8 -28.9%
Math-Physical Sciences 2.1 2.6% Math-Physical Sciences -4.2 -17.9%
Biological Sciences 1.3 1.6% Biological Sciences
Humanities Humanities
Other Other
Engineering 1.8 2.0% Engineering
Math-Physical Sciences 1.4 1.6% Math-Physical Sciences
Biological Sciences Biological Sciences
Humanities Humanities
Other Other
Engineering 1.9 2.1% Engineering -5.9 -18.0%
Math-Physical Sciences Math-Physical Sciences
Biological Sciences 1.9 2.1% Biological Sciences -9.0 -27.5%
Humanities Humanities
Other Other
Engineering 4.2 5.5% Engineering -13.9 -41.2%
Math-Physical Sciences 2.4 3.1% Math-Physical Sciences -9.7 -28.8%
Biological Sciences Biological Sciences
Humanities 3.6 4.7% Humanities
Other Other
Engineering 2.3 2.8% Engineering
Math-Physical Sciences Math-Physical Sciences
Biological Sciences Biological Sciences


























Math-Physical Sciences Math-Physical Sciences 3.4 18.5%















PERCENT FAIL EXAM:EXAM SCORE:
EXAM
PERCENT QUALIFIED OOD/U: MONTHS TO QUALIFY IF OODU QUALIFIED:
Final Exam 8.582.2
TABLE 17. 


















 Statistical relationships between college major and ASAT performance on test scores 
are often found to exist mainly by engineers and math/physical science majors achieving higher 
scores than social science majors.  Furthermore, engineers are less likely to fail SWO 
Fundamentals (-29%), Rules-of-Road (-18%), and Navigation (-41%) compared to social 
science majors. These findings support the emphasis Surface Navy places on engineering 
majors among its scholarship Academy and NROTC programs, but one must keep in mind 
these findings refer to classroom training experience and not shipboard experience (e.g., 




 The last group of explanatory variables specified in the early training models of junior 
surface warfare officers is that encompassed in navy experience, including: duty station and 
ship type selection and department assignments made by a ship‘s command.  
 
Duty Station.  As explained above, over half of newly commissioned surface warfare 
officers come from scholarship programs that allow graduates to chose their first duty station 
and ship type according to how well they did in their academic and military training courses in 
college. Those with the best grades have greater choices from which to select than those 
scoring lower in the pecking order. As seen in Panel (A) of Table 18 below, duty station appears 
to only affect the likelihood of someone obtaining their OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT for 
those having Japan/Guam as their homeports – where it is estimated that holding all else 
constant those based in the far Pacific are 30% more likely to qualify OOD/U than those in 
Norfolk, while all other observed differences across duty stations are not statistically significant. 
As discussed earlier, many stories were told about the increased optempo and underway time 
of ships based in Japan, which can explain such findings. 
Other differences in scores on ASAT exams and duty stations are found in the 
regression models, with strong negative relationships uncovered related to failing the Rules-of-
Road exam. In particular, junior officers from all homeports other than Japan/Guam had lower 
fail rates on this exam compared to ships based in Norfolk, ranging from -16% (San Diego) to -
37% (Pearl Harbor). It is important to keep in mind that the composition of ship types that differ 
across duty stations is controlled for in the multiple regression models, so that these estimates 
reflect the individual impact duty stations have on ASAT performance – separate from ship type 
effects.  
San Diego also stands out from the rest in regards to officers based there experience 
lower fail rates on SWO Fundamentals (-15%) and Navigation (-21%) exams. Similarly those 
based in the FL/TX/MI homeports (mainly Mayport, FL) have significantly lower fail rates on 
SWO Fundamentals (-27%) and Rules-of-Road (-19%) than officers based in Norfolk. As 
























Japan-Guam 1.4 1.8% Japan-Guam
Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor
San Diego 1.5 1.9% San Diego -3.8 -15.3%
Washington Washington
FL-TX-MI 2.3 2.9% FL-TX-MI -6.6 -26.5%
Japan-Guam Japan-Guam
Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor
San Diego 1.5 1.7% San Diego
Washington 2.7 3.1% Washington -5.5 -83.3%
FL-TX-MI 1.7 2.0% FL-TX-MI
Japan-Guam 0.9 1.0% Japan-Guam
Pearl Harbor 1.5 1.7% Pearl Harbor -12.8 -36.7%
San Diego 0.9 1.0% San Diego -5.5 -15.8%
Washington 1.9 2.1% Washington -10.8 -30.9%
FL-TX-MI 1.9 2.1% FL-TX-MI -6.7 -19.2%
Japan-Guam Japan-Guam
Pearl Harbor -3.6 -4.7% Pearl Harbor
San Diego 1.7 2.2% San Diego -7.2 -21.4%
Washington 2.2 2.9% Washington
FL-TX-MI FL-TX-MI
Japan-Guam Japan-Guam
Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor
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EXAM
PERCENT QUALIFIED OOD/U: MONTHS TO QUALIFY IF OODU QUALIFIED:
Final Exam 9.182.3
performance (via self-selecting more favorable duty stations) rather than differences that exist 
due to ships‘ scheduled underway time or time spent in repairs. 
 
 Ship Type.  There is a long tradition in the surface navy favoring assignment to major 
combatants (CGs and especially DDGs) over amphibious or other ship types.7  As shown in 
Panel (B) in Table 18 below, modeling results of the estimated impact of ship type on acquiring 
OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT finds those assigned to amphibious ships are13.7% less 
likely to be qualified compared to those assigned to DDGs, while there is no significant  
 
TABLE 18. 
Duty Station, Ship Type and ASAT Performance 
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 Newly commissioned officers today are not assigned to large deck carriers, however, the Division Officer data set 
























Frigates -2.5 -3.0% Frigates 7.1 43.3%
Cruisers Cruisers 
Amphibious -2.2 -2.7% Amphibious 8.1 49.4%
Other -4.2 -5.1% Other 17.0 103.7%
Frigates -2.2 -2.5% Frigates
Cruisers Cruisers 
Amphibious -1.9 -2.1% Amphibious 3.2 103.2%
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difference found among FFGs or CGs relative to destroyers. There are no surprises here, other 
than perhaps the finding that officers assigned to ―other‖ ship types that comprise only 6% of all  
ship types, are over 20% more likely to qualify than those on DDGs. Some or most of this may 
be attributed to those choosing minesweepers where junior officers have more responsibility 
and greater underway time than other ships. It may also be related to non-commissioned 
officers serving in similar shipboard environments aboard large deck carriers. 
 
 Department Assignments.  As expected, regression model findings related to 
department assignments and early junior officer training performance show no clear pattern. 
However there are a few relationships noteworthy for discussion. First, department assignment 
by senior leadership aboard ships does not appear to affect one‘s ability to acquire OOD/U 
qualification other than a few having to take more months to qualify (Operations and the 
unassigned ‗Deck/Executive‘ codes). Some department assignments are, however, related to 
performance on many ASAT exams. For example, those without major DIVO responsibilities are 
more likely to fail the SWO Fundamentals exam (+52%), the Maritime Warfare exam (+750%), 
and the Rules-of-Road exam (+38%) compared to those assigned to the Weapons Division.8 As  
                                                          
8
 It may be noted that the relatively large estimated impacts in proportional terms result because of the unusually low 
























Combat Systems Combat Systems
Operations Operations
Engineering Engineering
Navigation Navigation -19.2 -111.0%
Deck/Executive -1.5 -1.8% Deck/Executive 9.0 52.0%
Combat Systems -1.4 -1.5% Combat Systems
Operations 0.0% Operations
Engineering -1.9 -2.1% Engineering 3.9 557.1%
Navigation 0.0% Navigation
Deck/Executive -3.2 -3.5% Deck/Executive 5.3 757.1%
Combat Systems Combat Systems
Operations -1.0 -1.1% Operations 6.6 25.8%
Engineering 0.0% Engineering
Navigation 0.0% Navigation
Deck/Executive -2.6 -2.8% Deck/Executive 9.7 37.9%
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Operations Operations 6.9 42.1%
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Navigation Navigation
Deck/Executive Deck/Executive 3.2 19.5%
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explained earlier, it‘s not clear why these ―unassigned‖ junior officers fare so poorly, but 
regardless of the reason these findings suggest that the policy of simply bringing more and 
more ensigns onboard ships with hopes of later filling Department Head slots with quality 
surface warfare officers may not be the optimal personnel policy to follow. Setting young officers 
up for failure may not only have negative effects on those who become ‗the forgotten‘ but 
excess untrained junior officers also impinge upon the constrained time of senior enlisted chiefs, 
experienced junior officers as well as Department Heads, thus reducing the overall quality of 
junior officer training aboard ships.
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SWO Fundamentals Forecast Models 
 
 The regression model results given in the previous section lay the groundwork for 
building predictive models that may be used as a counseling tool for senior enlisted personnel 
and officers responsible for the training of young DIVOs as they progress toward their surface 
warfare pin. In particular, existing information from early schoolhouse training programs can be 
combined and used to build predictive models of success aboard ships (e.g., becoming OOD/U 
qualified by a pre-designated time) as well as passing tests and exams designed to be part of 
their early training (e.g., ASAT exams). 
 
Construction of Forecast Models 
 
 We have chosen to provide one such predictive model – that of passing the SWO 
Fundamentals exam at ASAT. This exam is administered during the first day or two of ASAT 
and is designed to capture basic knowledge that young DIVOs should understand over their first 
18 months of service aboard their ship. A non-linear regression model (binary logistic) is used to 
predict the probability of a junior surface warfare officer has of failing the exam. Since having 
the OOD/U qualification is so crucial to ASAT performance, in Table 20 below, we show the 
estimated probabilities of failing the SWO Fundamentals exam for individuals by selected 




No Yes Points Proportion
Total: 21.8% 15.5% -6.3% -28.9%
Gender:
Male 19.1% 13.5% -5.6% -29.3%
Female 32.6% 24.2% -8.4% -25.8%
Ethnicity:
White 18.6% 13.1% -5.5% -29.6%
Black 44.6% 34.7% -9.9% -22.2%
Hispanic 32.5% 24.1% -8.4% -25.8%
Source:
USNA 20.2% 14.3% -5.9% -29.2%
NROTC/MC 14.1% 9.8% -4.3% -30.5%
OCS/LC 37.4% 28.2% -9.2% -24.6%
Ship Type:
DDG 18.0% 12.7% -5.3% -29.4%
CG 26.8% 19.4% -7.4% -27.6%
FFG 18.8% 13.2% -5.6% -29.8%
AMPHIB 27.0% 19.6% -7.4% -27.4%
Duty Station:
Norfolk 25.0% 18.0% -7.0% -28.0%
San Diego 20.3% 14.4% -5.9% -29.1%
Washington 23.1% 16.5% -6.6% -28.6%
Pear Harbor 21.7% 15.5% -6.2% -28.6%
Japan/Guam 21.6% 15.3% -6.3% -29.2%
FL/TX/MI 17.0% 11.9% -5.1% -30.0%
DifferentialOOD/U Qualified
TABLE 20. 
Estimated Probability of Failing SWO Fundamentals Exam  















The non-linearities  of OOD/U qualification are explicitly shown in these figures, where 
for example males having the OOD/U qualification are predicted to have failure rates 29% lower 
on the SWO Fundamentals exam than males without the qualification, whereas the estimated 
probability is estimated to be 26% lower for females lacking OOD/U. Implicitly, one can also 
calculate non-linearities in estimates for other explanatory variables. For example, among 
officers who don‘t qualify OOD/U prior to ASAT, the probability of failing the exam is 9% points 
higher for those assigned to an amphibious ship compared to those on DDGs, whereas the 
differential due to these two ship types is only 6.9% among those already OOD/U qualified. It 
may be argued that the non-linear interrelationships allowed in these logistic model 
specifications better approximates real-world outcomes than the more simple independent 
effects characteristic of linear regression modeling. 
As such, logit models are used below to give shipboard personnel and ASAT training 
personnel estimates of how likely a junior officer may fail the SWO Fundamentals exam given 
personal characteristics and choices made prior to commissioning as well as choices made 
after commissioning. The four examples shown below are instructive in that the reader can 
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more clearly see how estimated impacts from all these interrelated choices add up so that those 
with relatively high failure rate probabilities can be better identified at the start of their careers. It 
might then be possible to use various early intervention strategies directed to at-risk junior 
officers that may enhance their chances of success in the PQS qualification process as well as 
at classroom training required during the early stages of their military careers. 
 We offer four selected patterns of choices representative junior surface warfare officers 
may take regarding commissioning programs at various types of colleges and their 
undergraduate majors, and later making duty station-ship type selections, and finally being 
assigned as DIVO to a specific department aboard their first ship. In the first two scenarios 
(Panels (A) and (B)) of Figure 6, a typical white female of average age at commissioning is 
projected to have a 24% chance of failing the SWO Fundamentals exam at ASAT. If we further 
choose among this initial sub-set only those who graduate from a moderately competitive 
college (i.e., of average selectivity) out of OCS with a social science major, the expected failure 
rate rises to over 30% (already an increase of 25% from the initial sub-set). If the college 
graduate is at the top of her class, her chances of success doesn‘t differ much from the initial 
average for white females, but if we follow the selected sub-set who may have ranked near the 
bottom of OCS graduates and is left with an FFG based in Norfolk, we find her chance of failing 
the exam is now over 40%. Finally, her expected chance of failing SWO Fundamentals would 
be expected to improve to one-in-three if the CO assigns her the DIVO of Combat Systems 
Department, but to fall to one-in-two if not assigned to any specific department. In the latter 
scenario, we find the predicted failure rate to have doubled relative to the average sub-set 
depicted. 
 The importance of becoming OOD/U qualified is next shown in Panel(B) of Figure 6, by 
having the same type of junior officer come into the fleet with the same college experience and 
be given the same assignments as above. Here we find a 28.4% expected failure rate for this 
same cohort as we now follow the joint probabilities along the path of someone who does not 
qualify OOD/U prior to ASAT. If assigned to a frigate out of Norfolk, their expected failure rate 
increases to 46.4%, with a final expected failure rate on SWOS Fundamentals to range between 
38% to near 60%. 
 First, comparison of these two trajectories of exam failure/success once more points out 
how important gaining one‘s OOD/U qualification is to later schoolhouse success. Second, we 
can more clearly see the role assignment policies and strategies have on an individual‘s 
success at ASAT. For example, these models can help identify individuals with college 
experience combinations that are more likely than others to be ‗at-risk‘ when coming to ASAT. 
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FIGURE 6. (Continued) 
ESTIMATED JOINT PROBABILITIES OF FAILING SWO FUNDAMENTALS EXAM 
































































second tour Lieutenants, Chiefs, or Department Heads. The ship‘s Training Officer could also 
ensure that the ‗at-risk‘ junior officers be given special time and responsibilities to learn material  
critical to the basic fundamental skills required of DIVOs. Finally, special resources at ASAT 
could also be directed to these could also be directed to these ‗at-risk‘ officers. 
 To show the range of expectations of exam failure we next refer to two relatively extreme 
examples of junior officers and the choices/assignments made by each. In Panel (A) of Figure 6, 
we follow the expected failure rate probabilities of a white male aged 22 from a most selective 
civilian college with an engineering major who receives an OCS commission. He obtains his 
OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT and is predicted to have less than a 6% chance of failing the 
SWO Fundamentals exam. If he has done well in college his chances fall to 3.5% as perhaps he 
was able to select a DDG out of Mayport, Fl. Finally, if he is chosen to be DIVO of the Combat 
Systems Department he has only a 2.4% chance of failure at ASAT. 
 This above pattern of joint probabilities stands in contrast to a Hispanic male officer aged 
24 coming to the navy from a less competitive civilian college with a social science major and 
who does not obtain his OOD/U qualification prior to ASAT. This individual already stands a 
one-in-two chance of failing the SWO Fundamentals exam. If he was near the bottom of his 
class out of college and say, can only select an amphibious ship out of Norfolk, his chances of 
failure rise to two-out-of-three. His chances of failure once more are affected in the end by 
department assignment, where we estimate his probability to fail the exam to range from 50% if 
assigned Combat Systems DIVO to over 70% if not given a specific DIVO assignment. 
 The above scenarios are clearly instructive that success or failure at ASAT is the result 
of many interrelated factors, some of which are external to the ship or navy culture, but other 
intervening choices involving Surface Navy assignment policies also play an important role in 
the success or failure of junior surface warfare officers progressing through their early training 
pipeline. 
 
Use of Forecast Models 
 
If one were interested in using predictive models of ASAT success to identify ‗at-risk‘ 
junior officers, then one must have a clear understanding of how such models might be used in 
terms of predicting accurately the pass-fail outcomes of junior officers. The distribution of the 
estimated probability of failing the SWO Fundamentals exam based on the logit model specified 
earlier is given in Figure 7 below. If we wish to identify ‗at-risk‘ junior officers, we could choose a 
threshold failure rate for which to classify someone as either ‗at-risk‘ or ‗not at-risk.‘ To do this 
we can make two types of errors. First, we might classify someone ‗at-risk‘ but in fact passes 
the exam. Giving these individuals extra help or directing special resources to his/her success at 
ASAT would be wasting time and money. Second, we might classify someone as ‗not at risk‘ but 
who in fact does fail the ASAT exam. In these cases, we would not be directing special 
resources to where they are most helpful. These two cases of errors are better known as ―false 
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positive errors‖ (someone who doesn‘t need special treatment but gets it) and ―false negative 
errors‖ (someone who should receive special treatment but doesn‘t get it).  
 Both of these types of forecast errors, along with overall forecast accuracy measures are 
presented below in Table 21. From the table we observe a clear trade-off when choosing a 
threshold failure rate to classify ‗at-risk‘ junior officers. The higher the threshold probability of 
failing an exam that we set, the less ―false positive‖ errors we make (wasting resources on those 
who shouldn‘t get it) and the more ―false negative‖ errors we make (overlooking those who 
should get special treatment but don‘t). If the latter error is deemed more serious to make then 
we may opt for a lower threshold of failure, meaning we would have to spend more money on 
delivering more special services to those whose predictive failure rate exceeds, say, 20%. Our 
model tells us that we would correctly classify two-out-of-three junior officers, and only have to 
experience slightly over 10% ―false negative‖ predictions – whereby we think someone doesn‘t 
require special attention but in fact does.  
 As noted, however, by choosing a lower failure rate threshold, we may seriously 
constrain budgets needed to deliver additional resources designed to improve ASAT exam 
performance. These budget constraints are likely to move us in the other direction whereby we 
only offer special services to those with relatively high failure rate probabilities. In this case, we 
would tend to not waste time and resources on individuals who really don‘t require special 
 
FIGURE 7. 














Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
21% 827 37.0% 1519 68.5% 528 64.2% 170 12.2%
30% 449 20.3% 1689 76.2% 256 57.0% 272 15.3%
40% 236 10.6% 1748 78.8% 120 50.8% 349 17.6%
50% 116 5.5% 1762 80.0% 53 45.7% 402 23.4%
Actual Number Fail = 465; Percent Fail = 21.0%
Predicted to Fail:Threshold Predicted 
Failure Probability
False 'Positives' False 'Negatives'Cases Correctly Predicted:
TABLE 21 . 
Analysis of Prediction Accuracy Under Differing  









attention, but we would withhold special resources more and more from those who truly benefit 
from special resources that are directed toward success in ASAT exams. 
 Another way to use the predictive results is in the setting of personal counseling 
between a mentor and a junior surface warfare officer. Here we don‘t have to be concerned with 
cost savings from differing ASAT threshold exam failure rates. Rather a mentor could be 
provided estimated probabilities of exam fail rates for his/her mentee based on the predictive 
logit model specified above. The mentor could use these predictions along with other observed 
behavior when counseling whether or not a junior officer should exert special effort towards 
preparing for an ASAT exam (or other modeled outcome like OOD/U qualification). For 
example, the mentor would be provided the following table that gives observed probabilities of 
failing the SWO Fundamental exam based upon ranges of predicted failure rates. If the junior 
officer‘s predicted fail rate falls, say, in the ‗high‘ classification then he or she would know they 














ESTIMATED CHANCE OF FAILING SWO 
FUNDAMENTALS EXAM AT ASAT
TABLE 22. 







 Currently, the policy is to send junior officers off to ASAT without any knowledge of how 
likely they are to be successful in passing the administered exams. Current personnel 
information exists that could easily be used to assist individual junior officers to achieve greater 
success in their early training pipeline, and perhaps directing specific resources to those most in 
need of assistance to ensure greater success in the training process. Ignoring such information 
is setting some junior officers up for failure, when it is possible to provide early intervention 







B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.520 0.038 13.852 0.000 (Constant) 15.321 1.484 10.327 0.000
AGE2021 0.037 0.036 0.023 1.026 0.305 AGE2021 -0.166 1.380 -0.004 -0.120 0.904
AGE2429 -0.041 0.032 -0.037 -1.297 0.195 AGE2429 0.285 1.334 0.008 0.213 0.831
AGE30PL -0.015 0.058 -0.010 -0.257 0.797 AGE30PL 6.163 2.323 0.149 2.653 0.008
FEMALE 0.020 0.026 0.017 0.768 0.443 FEMALE -0.708 1.040 -0.020 -0.681 0.496
ETHBLK -0.084 0.037 -0.049 -2.240 0.025 ETHBLK -1.860 1.544 -0.034 -1.205 0.229
ETHHIS -0.035 0.045 -0.016 -0.773 0.440 ETHHIS -1.706 1.783 -0.027 -0.957 0.339
ETHASN -0.058 0.044 -0.028 -1.308 0.191 ETHASN 1.484 1.803 0.023 0.823 0.411
ETHOTH 0.029 0.058 0.011 0.508 0.612 ETHOTH -2.455 2.141 -0.032 -1.147 0.252
CSNROTC -0.040 0.029 -0.035 -1.375 0.169 CSNROTC -0.431 1.136 -0.013 -0.379 0.705
CSOCS -0.058 0.034 -0.053 -1.714 0.087 CSOCS -0.657 1.394 -0.019 -0.472 0.637
CSECP 0.037 0.058 0.016 0.642 0.521 CSECP 1.013 2.257 0.015 0.449 0.654
CSLDO -0.015 0.073 -0.007 -0.201 0.840 CSLDO -0.975 2.510 -0.018 -0.389 0.698
CSCWO 0.225 0.084 0.131 2.683 0.007 CSCWO 3.726 3.137 0.081 1.188 0.235
COLLMC -0.015 0.052 -0.006 -0.297 0.767 COLLMC 1.552 2.144 0.021 0.724 0.469
COLLLC 0.031 0.043 0.016 0.723 0.470 COLLLC -0.496 1.705 -0.008 -0.291 0.771
MAJENG 0.025 0.029 0.019 0.843 0.399 MAJENG 1.451 1.170 0.037 1.241 0.215
MAJMSCI
0.021 0.032 0.014 0.642 0.521
MAJMSCI
3.383 1.277 0.078 2.649 0.008
MAJBSCI -0.004 0.044 -0.002 -0.087 0.931 MAJBSCI 2.988 1.764 0.049 1.694 0.091
MAJHUM 0.054 0.042 0.029 1.292 0.196 MAJHUM 0.504 1.612 0.009 0.313 0.755
MAJOTH -0.013 0.066 -0.004 -0.195 0.846 MAJOTH 2.323 2.615 0.025 0.888 0.375
MARRIED 0.013 0.026 0.012 0.486 0.627 MARRIED 4.282 1.018 0.135 4.204 0.000
SHIPFFG -0.003 0.037 -0.002 -0.085 0.932 SHIPFFG -4.273 1.443 -0.100 -2.960 0.003
SHIPCG -0.006 0.032 -0.004 -0.176 0.860 SHIPCG -2.867 1.279 -0.067 -2.241 0.025
SHIPAMP -0.074 0.030 -0.063 -2.479 0.013 SHIPAMP 1.440 1.233 0.039 1.168 0.243
SHIPOTH 0.118 0.061 0.043 1.923 0.055 SHIPOTH -0.234 2.155 -0.003 -0.109 0.914
PORTGJAP 0.152 0.036 0.097 4.226 0.000 PORTGJAP 1.439 1.324 0.033 1.087 0.277
PORTPRL -0.037 0.045 -0.019 -0.826 0.409 PORTPRL -0.509 1.880 -0.008 -0.271 0.786
PORTSDG 0.020 0.026 0.018 0.762 0.446 PORTSDG -1.071 1.050 -0.033 -1.020 0.308
PORTWAS 0.022 0.060 0.008 0.364 0.716 PORTWAS -1.474 2.307 -0.019 -0.639 0.523
PORTFTI 0.024 0.039 0.016 0.615 0.539 PORTFTI -0.223 1.508 -0.005 -0.148 0.883
DEPCS -0.008 0.038 -0.007 -0.225 0.822 DEPCS -0.057 1.510 -0.001 -0.037 0.970
DEPNAV -0.105 0.141 -0.016 -0.749 0.454 DEPNAV -0.485 6.473 -0.002 -0.075 0.940
DEPOPS 0.016 0.034 0.014 0.482 0.630 DEPOPS 6.928 1.353 0.202 5.120 0.000
DEPENG 0.036 0.034 0.032 1.058 0.290 DEPENG 1.370 1.335 0.041 1.026 0.305












1 .211 .044 .029 .491 1 .390 .152 .126 14.036
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 25 35 .700 2.904 .000 Regression 40360 35 1153 5.854 .000
Residual 528 2188 .241 Residual 225363 1144 197
Total 552 2223 Total 265723 1179
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Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 82.000 0.637 128.704 0.000 (Constant) 81.148 0.661 122.696 0.000
AGE2021 1.844 0.604 0.064 3.051 0.002 AGE2021 1.784 0.602 0.062 2.965 0.003
AGE2429 -0.447 0.540 -0.022 -0.827 0.409 AGE2429 -0.382 0.538 -0.019 -0.709 0.478
AGE30PL -0.929 0.975 -0.035 -0.952 0.341 AGE30PL -0.905 0.971 -0.034 -0.932 0.351
FEMALE -2.753 0.448 -0.129 -6.142 0.000 FEMALE -2.785 0.446 -0.130 -6.240 0.000
ETHBLK -6.085 0.632 -0.198 -9.634 0.000 ETHBLK -5.949 0.629 -0.193 -9.451 0.000
ETHHIS -4.159 0.757 -0.110 -5.493 0.000 ETHHIS -4.104 0.754 -0.109 -5.443 0.000
ETHASN -0.971 0.752 -0.026 -1.291 0.197 ETHASN -0.871 0.749 -0.023 -1.163 0.245
ETHOTH -1.500 0.982 -0.030 -1.527 0.127 ETHOTH -1.549 0.978 -0.031 -1.584 0.113
CSNROTC -0.687 0.488 -0.034 -1.407 0.159 CSNROTC -0.620 0.486 -0.031 -1.276 0.202
CSOCS -1.302 0.570 -0.066 -2.282 0.023 CSOCS -1.209 0.568 -0.061 -2.129 0.033
CSECP 1.898 0.984 0.046 1.928 0.054 CSECP 1.835 0.980 0.044 1.872 0.061
CSLDO 0.151 1.240 0.004 0.122 0.903 CSLDO 0.177 1.234 0.005 0.144 0.886
CSCWO -0.412 1.419 -0.013 -0.290 0.772 CSCWO -0.784 1.415 -0.025 -0.554 0.580
COLLMC 3.241 0.883 0.075 3.669 0.000 COLLMC 3.264 0.879 0.076 3.712 0.000
COLLLC -3.095 0.729 -0.088 -4.244 0.000 COLLLC -3.141 0.726 -0.089 -4.327 0.000
MAJENG 2.824 0.501 0.120 5.639 0.000 MAJENG 2.786 0.499 0.118 5.589 0.000
MAJMSCI 2.137 0.546 0.082 3.915 0.000 MAJMSCI 2.101 0.543 0.081 3.866 0.000
MAJBSCI 1.258 0.750 0.035 1.678 0.094 MAJBSCI 1.262 0.746 0.035 1.692 0.091
MAJHUM 0.755 0.717 0.022 1.053 0.292 MAJHUM 0.662 0.714 0.019 0.927 0.354
MAJOTH 0.695 1.112 0.013 0.625 0.532 MAJOTH 0.716 1.107 0.013 0.646 0.518
MARRIED 0.619 0.437 0.032 1.416 0.157 MARRIED 0.601 0.435 0.031 1.381 0.167
SHIPFFG -2.485 0.626 -0.097 -3.970 0.000 SHIPFFG -2.486 0.623 -0.097 -3.989 0.000
SHIPCG -0.679 0.544 -0.027 -1.248 0.212 SHIPCG -0.674 0.542 -0.027 -1.243 0.214
SHIPAMP -2.324 0.510 -0.109 -4.561 0.000 SHIPAMP -2.206 0.508 -0.104 -4.343 0.000
SHIPOTH -4.009 1.036 -0.081 -3.868 0.000 SHIPOTH -4.206 1.033 -0.085 -4.073 0.000
PORTGJAP 1.688 0.609 0.060 2.771 0.006 PORTGJAP 1.439 0.609 0.051 2.363 0.018
PORTPRL 0.602 0.757 0.017 0.795 0.427 PORTPRL 0.660 0.754 0.019 0.876 0.381
PORTSDG 1.540 0.446 0.078 3.453 0.001 PORTSDG 1.505 0.444 0.077 3.390 0.001
PORTWAS 1.115 1.025 0.023 1.088 0.277 PORTWAS 1.077 1.020 0.022 1.055 0.291
PORTFTI 2.368 0.657 0.087 3.606 0.000 PORTFTI 2.331 0.654 0.086 3.566 0.000
DEPCS 0.916 0.639 0.039 1.433 0.152 DEPCS 0.936 0.637 0.040 1.470 0.142
DEPNAV 2.585 2.383 0.022 1.085 0.278 DEPNAV 2.760 2.372 0.023 1.164 0.245
DEPOPS 0.271 0.574 0.013 0.472 0.637 DEPOPS 0.248 0.572 0.012 0.434 0.665
DEPENG -0.130 0.569 -0.007 -0.229 0.819 DEPENG -0.189 0.567 -0.009 -0.333 0.739
DEPOTH -1.399 0.784 -0.046 -1.784 0.075 DEPOTH -1.483 0.781 -0.049 -1.899 0.058












1 .400 .160 .146 8.315 1 .409 .168 .154 8.277
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 28643 35 818 11.838 .000 Regression 30061 36 835 12.188 .000
Residual 150781 2181 69 Residual 149363 2180 69


























B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.146 0.030 4.892 0.000 (Constant) 0.178 0.031 5.756 0.000
AGE2021 -0.029 0.028 -0.022 -1.012 0.312 AGE2021 -0.026 0.028 -0.020 -0.933 0.351
AGE2429 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.280 0.779 AGE2429 0.005 0.025 0.005 0.183 0.855
AGE30PL 0.013 0.046 0.011 0.281 0.779 AGE30PL 0.012 0.045 0.010 0.262 0.793
FEMALE 0.114 0.021 0.117 5.422 0.000 FEMALE 0.115 0.021 0.119 5.496 0.000
ETHBLK 0.249 0.029 0.179 8.432 0.000 ETHBLK 0.244 0.029 0.175 8.271 0.000
ETHHIS 0.126 0.035 0.074 3.576 0.000 ETHHIS 0.124 0.035 0.073 3.526 0.000
ETHASN 0.043 0.035 0.025 1.215 0.224 ETHASN 0.039 0.035 0.023 1.109 0.267
ETHOTH 0.084 0.046 0.037 1.822 0.069 ETHOTH 0.085 0.046 0.038 1.868 0.062
CSNROTC 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.971 0.332 CSNROTC 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.862 0.389
CSOCS 0.046 0.027 0.051 1.725 0.085 CSOCS 0.042 0.027 0.047 1.596 0.111
CSECP -0.072 0.046 -0.039 -1.572 0.116 CSECP -0.070 0.046 -0.037 -1.524 0.128
CSLDO -0.015 0.058 -0.009 -0.252 0.801 CSLDO -0.016 0.058 -0.009 -0.270 0.787
CSCWO 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 1.000 CSCWO 0.014 0.066 0.010 0.214 0.830
COLLMC -0.070 0.041 -0.036 -1.701 0.089 COLLMC -0.071 0.041 -0.036 -1.727 0.084
COLLLC 0.111 0.034 0.069 3.257 0.001 COLLLC 0.113 0.034 0.071 3.318 0.001
MAJENG -0.070 0.023 -0.065 -2.982 0.003 MAJENG -0.068 0.023 -0.064 -2.929 0.003
MAJMSCI -0.044 0.025 -0.037 -1.717 0.086 MAJMSCI -0.042 0.025 -0.036 -1.668 0.096
MAJBSCI -0.046 0.035 -0.028 -1.323 0.186 MAJBSCI -0.046 0.035 -0.028 -1.332 0.183
MAJHUM -0.021 0.033 -0.014 -0.640 0.522 MAJHUM -0.018 0.033 -0.011 -0.535 0.592
MAJOTH -0.028 0.052 -0.011 -0.530 0.596 MAJOTH -0.028 0.052 -0.011 -0.547 0.584
MARRIED -0.015 0.020 -0.017 -0.732 0.464 MARRIED -0.014 0.020 -0.016 -0.700 0.484
SHIPFFG 0.071 0.029 0.061 2.427 0.015 SHIPFFG 0.071 0.029 0.061 2.434 0.015
SHIPCG 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.093 0.926 SHIPCG 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.085 0.932
SHIPAMP 0.086 0.024 0.089 3.605 0.000 SHIPAMP 0.081 0.024 0.085 3.421 0.001
SHIPOTH 0.163 0.048 0.072 3.364 0.001 SHIPOTH 0.170 0.048 0.076 3.526 0.000
PORTGJAP -0.037 0.028 -0.029 -1.286 0.199 PORTGJAP -0.027 0.028 -0.021 -0.951 0.342
PORTPRL -0.023 0.035 -0.014 -0.654 0.513 PORTPRL -0.025 0.035 -0.016 -0.718 0.473
PORTSDG -0.040 0.021 -0.045 -1.910 0.056 PORTSDG -0.038 0.021 -0.043 -1.852 0.064
PORTWAS -0.017 0.048 -0.008 -0.363 0.716 PORTWAS -0.016 0.048 -0.007 -0.334 0.739
PORTFTI -0.067 0.031 -0.055 -2.195 0.028 PORTFTI -0.066 0.031 -0.054 -2.156 0.031
DEPCS -0.047 0.030 -0.045 -1.575 0.115 DEPCS -0.048 0.030 -0.045 -1.605 0.109
DEPNAV -0.185 0.111 -0.035 -1.663 0.096 DEPNAV -0.192 0.111 -0.036 -1.728 0.084
DEPOPS -0.019 0.027 -0.020 -0.695 0.487 DEPOPS -0.018 0.027 -0.019 -0.664 0.507
DEPENG 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.928 0.353 DEPENG 0.027 0.027 0.030 1.015 0.310
DEPOTH 0.087 0.037 0.063 2.364 0.018 DEPOTH 0.090 0.037 0.066 2.458 0.014




Std. Error of 






1 .324 .105 .091 .388 1 .333 .111 .096 .387
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 39 35 1.104 7.319 .000 Regression 41 36 1.130 7.539 .000
Residual 329 2181 .151 Residual 327 2180 .150



























B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 89.305 0.670 133.371 0.000 (Constant) 88.305 0.702 125.758 0.000
AGE2021 2.256 0.626 0.088 3.603 0.000 AGE2021 2.185 0.623 0.085 3.508 0.000
AGE2429 -0.979 0.568 -0.054 -1.723 0.085 AGE2429 -0.866 0.565 -0.048 -1.533 0.126
AGE30PL -2.571 0.995 -0.117 -2.585 0.010 AGE30PL -2.500 0.989 -0.114 -2.528 0.012
FEMALE -0.400 0.468 -0.021 -0.855 0.393 FEMALE -0.431 0.465 -0.022 -0.927 0.354
ETHBLK -1.656 0.650 -0.061 -2.548 0.011 ETHBLK -1.550 0.647 -0.057 -2.397 0.017
ETHHIS -2.119 0.773 -0.064 -2.742 0.006 ETHHIS -2.073 0.769 -0.062 -2.698 0.007
ETHASN -1.616 0.769 -0.049 -2.101 0.036 ETHASN -1.478 0.766 -0.045 -1.930 0.054
ETHOTH -0.135 0.937 -0.003 -0.144 0.885 ETHOTH -0.154 0.932 -0.004 -0.165 0.869
CSNROTC -0.675 0.503 -0.038 -1.341 0.180 CSNROTC -0.621 0.501 -0.035 -1.241 0.215
CSOCS 0.468 0.606 0.026 0.772 0.440 CSOCS 0.488 0.602 0.027 0.810 0.418
CSECP 1.370 0.972 0.040 1.409 0.159 CSECP 1.326 0.967 0.039 1.372 0.170
CSLDO 2.007 1.125 0.068 1.785 0.075 CSLDO 2.047 1.119 0.069 1.830 0.067
CSCWO -1.917 1.368 -0.078 -1.402 0.161 CSCWO -2.235 1.362 -0.091 -1.641 0.101
COLLMC 3.239 0.904 0.085 3.584 0.000 COLLMC 3.314 0.899 0.087 3.687 0.000
COLLLC -0.652 0.790 -0.020 -0.825 0.409 COLLLC -0.653 0.785 -0.020 -0.831 0.406
MAJENG 1.809 0.515 0.087 3.515 0.000 MAJENG 1.795 0.512 0.086 3.506 0.000
MAJMSCI 0.899 0.571 0.039 1.576 0.115 MAJMSCI 0.893 0.567 0.038 1.573 0.116
MAJBSCI 1.432 0.730 0.047 1.962 0.050 MAJBSCI 1.442 0.726 0.048 1.987 0.047
MAJHUM -0.084 0.743 -0.003 -0.113 0.910 MAJHUM -0.127 0.739 -0.004 -0.172 0.863
MAJOTH 0.810 1.199 0.016 0.676 0.499 MAJOTH 0.815 1.192 0.016 0.684 0.494
MARRIED 0.907 0.448 0.054 2.025 0.043 MARRIED 0.891 0.446 0.053 1.999 0.046
SHIPFFG -2.338 0.640 -0.106 -3.651 0.000 SHIPFFG -2.211 0.637 -0.100 -3.470 0.001
SHIPCG -0.860 0.560 -0.038 -1.534 0.125 SHIPCG -0.816 0.557 -0.036 -1.464 0.143
SHIPAMP -2.063 0.529 -0.110 -3.903 0.000 SHIPAMP -1.888 0.527 -0.101 -3.583 0.000
SHIPOTH -4.820 1.096 -0.106 -4.397 0.000 SHIPOTH -4.987 1.091 -0.110 -4.572 0.000
PORTGJAP 1.274 0.632 0.050 2.015 0.044 PORTGJAP 0.949 0.633 0.037 1.499 0.134
PORTPRL 0.219 0.799 0.007 0.274 0.784 PORTPRL 0.265 0.794 0.008 0.334 0.739
PORTSDG 1.528 0.458 0.088 3.340 0.001 PORTSDG 1.508 0.455 0.087 3.315 0.001
PORTWAS 2.666 1.027 0.063 2.596 0.010 PORTWAS 2.693 1.021 0.063 2.636 0.008
PORTFTI 1.727 0.663 0.075 2.607 0.009 PORTFTI 1.658 0.659 0.072 2.515 0.012
DEPCS -1.335 0.667 -0.065 -2.001 0.046 DEPCS -1.362 0.663 -0.067 -2.053 0.040
DEPNAV 1.255 2.592 0.011 0.484 0.628 DEPNAV 1.409 2.578 0.013 0.547 0.585
DEPOPS -0.697 0.601 -0.038 -1.160 0.246 DEPOPS -0.717 0.598 -0.039 -1.199 0.231
DEPENG -1.862 0.597 -0.105 -3.120 0.002 DEPENG -1.935 0.594 -0.109 -3.259 0.001
DEPOTH -3.159 0.801 -0.121 -3.946 0.000 DEPOTH -3.243 0.796 -0.125 -4.072 0.000















1 .351 .123 .105 7.5244 .366 .134 .115 7.4824
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 13527 35 386 6.826 .000 Regression 14653 36 407 7.270 .000
Residual 96136 1698 57 Residual 95009 1697 56
Total 109662 1733 Total 109662 1733
ANOVA Table ANOVA Table
Model Summary Model Summary





























































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.021 0.019 1.119 0.263 (Constant) 0.045 0.020 2.251 0.025
AGE2021 -0.016 0.018 -0.023 -0.899 0.369 AGE2021 -0.014 0.018 -0.020 -0.808 0.419
AGE2429 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.052 0.958 AGE2429 -0.002 0.016 -0.004 -0.113 0.910
AGE30PL 0.040 0.028 0.067 1.438 0.151 AGE30PL 0.039 0.028 0.065 1.384 0.167
FEMALE 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.655 0.513 FEMALE 0.009 0.013 0.018 0.713 0.476
ETHBLK 0.048 0.018 0.065 2.634 0.009 ETHBLK 0.046 0.018 0.062 2.506 0.012
ETHHIS 0.025 0.022 0.028 1.157 0.247 ETHHIS 0.024 0.022 0.027 1.112 0.266
ETHASN 0.050 0.022 0.056 2.304 0.021 ETHASN 0.047 0.022 0.052 2.160 0.031
ETHOTH -0.017 0.026 -0.016 -0.654 0.513 ETHOTH -0.017 0.026 -0.015 -0.640 0.522
CSNROTC 0.008 0.014 0.017 0.595 0.552 CSNROTC 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.508 0.612
CSOCS 0.000 0.017 -0.001 -0.020 0.984 CSOCS -0.001 0.017 -0.002 -0.048 0.962
CSECP -0.028 0.027 -0.030 -1.020 0.308 CSECP -0.027 0.027 -0.029 -0.987 0.324
CSLDO -0.034 0.032 -0.042 -1.075 0.282 CSLDO -0.035 0.032 -0.044 -1.109 0.268
CSCWO 0.062 0.038 0.093 1.612 0.107 CSCWO 0.069 0.038 0.104 1.810 0.070
COLLMC -0.010 0.025 -0.010 -0.411 0.681 COLLMC -0.012 0.025 -0.012 -0.483 0.629
COLLLC -0.004 0.022 -0.004 -0.169 0.866 COLLLC -0.004 0.022 -0.004 -0.168 0.866
MAJENG -0.022 0.014 -0.040 -1.549 0.122 MAJENG -0.022 0.014 -0.039 -1.531 0.126
MAJMSCI -0.008 0.016 -0.012 -0.482 0.630 MAJMSCI -0.008 0.016 -0.012 -0.475 0.635
MAJBSCI -0.025 0.021 -0.030 -1.214 0.225 MAJBSCI -0.025 0.020 -0.031 -1.231 0.219
MAJHUM 0.031 0.021 0.037 1.471 0.142 MAJHUM 0.032 0.021 0.038 1.525 0.128
MAJOTH -0.022 0.034 -0.016 -0.656 0.512 MAJOTH -0.022 0.034 -0.016 -0.662 0.508
MARRIED -0.017 0.013 -0.036 -1.311 0.190 MARRIED -0.016 0.013 -0.035 -1.285 0.199
SHIPFFG 0.015 0.018 0.025 0.847 0.397 SHIPFFG 0.012 0.018 0.021 0.684 0.494
SHIPCG -0.015 0.016 -0.025 -0.967 0.334 SHIPCG -0.016 0.016 -0.027 -1.036 0.300
SHIPAMP 0.036 0.015 0.070 2.402 0.016 SHIPAMP 0.032 0.015 0.062 2.128 0.033
SHIPOTH 0.096 0.031 0.078 3.104 0.002 SHIPOTH 0.100 0.031 0.081 3.241 0.001
PORTGJAP -0.028 0.018 -0.041 -1.578 0.115 PORTGJAP -0.020 0.018 -0.030 -1.145 0.252
PORTPRL 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.061 0.951 PORTPRL 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.013 0.990
PORTSDG -0.014 0.013 -0.030 -1.113 0.266 PORTSDG -0.014 0.013 -0.029 -1.081 0.280
PORTWAS -0.055 0.029 -0.048 -1.897 0.058 PORTWAS -0.055 0.029 -0.048 -1.926 0.054
PORTFTI -0.009 0.019 -0.015 -0.492 0.623 PORTFTI -0.008 0.019 -0.012 -0.405 0.685
DEPCS 0.010 0.019 0.017 0.514 0.607 DEPCS 0.010 0.019 0.019 0.550 0.582
DEPNAV -0.045 0.073 -0.015 -0.613 0.540 DEPNAV -0.048 0.073 -0.016 -0.665 0.506
DEPOPS 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.182 0.856 DEPOPS 0.004 0.017 0.007 0.209 0.834
DEPENG 0.038 0.017 0.078 2.240 0.025 DEPENG 0.039 0.017 0.082 2.350 0.019
DEPOTH 0.051 0.023 0.073 2.277 0.023 DEPOTH 0.053 0.022 0.075 2.373 0.018















1 .244 .059 .040 .212 1 .259 .067 .047 .211
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 5 35 .137 3.060 .000 Regression 5 36 .150 3.385 .000





Model Summary Model Summary
ANOVA Table ANOVA Table
Sig. Level























































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 91.137 0.597 152.711 0.000 (Constant) 90.038 0.617 145.957 0.000
AGE2021 1.320 0.566 0.051 2.333 0.020 AGE2021 1.243 0.561 0.048 2.216 0.027
AGE2429 -0.705 0.506 -0.039 -1.394 0.164 AGE2429 -0.623 0.502 -0.034 -1.242 0.215
AGE30PL -0.924 0.914 -0.038 -1.011 0.312 AGE30PL -0.893 0.906 -0.037 -0.986 0.324
FEMALE -0.501 0.420 -0.026 -1.191 0.234 FEMALE -0.544 0.417 -0.028 -1.307 0.192
ETHBLK -3.515 0.592 -0.127 -5.941 0.000 ETHBLK -3.339 0.587 -0.121 -5.687 0.000
ETHHIS -1.737 0.709 -0.051 -2.449 0.014 ETHHIS -1.665 0.703 -0.049 -2.368 0.018
ETHASN -1.245 0.705 -0.037 -1.766 0.078 ETHASN -1.115 0.699 -0.033 -1.595 0.111
ETHOTH -0.484 0.920 -0.011 -0.526 0.599 ETHOTH -0.547 0.912 -0.012 -0.599 0.549
CSNROTC 0.007 0.457 0.000 0.016 0.988 CSNROTC 0.092 0.453 0.005 0.204 0.838
CSOCS -0.590 0.534 -0.033 -1.104 0.270 CSOCS -0.471 0.530 -0.027 -0.888 0.374
CSECP 2.207 0.925 0.059 2.385 0.017 CSECP 2.114 0.917 0.057 2.305 0.021
CSLDO 2.650 1.161 0.079 2.282 0.023 CSLDO 2.684 1.151 0.080 2.332 0.020
CSCWO -3.507 1.330 -0.126 -2.637 0.008 CSCWO -3.991 1.320 -0.143 -3.023 0.003
COLLMC 3.026 0.827 0.078 3.658 0.000 COLLMC 3.056 0.820 0.079 3.726 0.000
COLLLC -0.976 0.683 -0.031 -1.428 0.153 COLLLC -1.036 0.677 -0.033 -1.530 0.126
MAJENG 1.961 0.469 0.093 4.177 0.000 MAJENG 1.910 0.465 0.090 4.104 0.000
MAJMSCI 0.681 0.511 0.029 1.333 0.183 MAJMSCI 0.635 0.507 0.027 1.252 0.211
MAJBSCI 1.871 0.702 0.057 2.664 0.008 MAJBSCI 1.877 0.696 0.058 2.697 0.007
MAJHUM 0.919 0.672 0.030 1.369 0.171 MAJHUM 0.800 0.666 0.026 1.201 0.230
MAJOTH -0.097 1.042 -0.002 -0.093 0.926 MAJOTH -0.069 1.033 -0.001 -0.067 0.947
MARRIED 0.824 0.410 0.048 2.011 0.044 MARRIED 0.802 0.406 0.047 1.976 0.048
SHIPFFG -0.838 0.586 -0.036 -1.428 0.153 SHIPFFG -0.839 0.581 -0.036 -1.444 0.149
SHIPCG -0.112 0.510 -0.005 -0.220 0.826 SHIPCG -0.109 0.506 -0.005 -0.215 0.830
SHIPAMP 0.277 0.477 0.015 0.580 0.562 SHIPAMP 0.428 0.474 0.022 0.903 0.367
SHIPOTH 1.508 0.971 0.034 1.553 0.121 SHIPOTH 1.252 0.963 0.028 1.299 0.194
PORTGJAP 1.252 0.571 0.050 2.194 0.028 PORTGJAP 0.931 0.568 0.037 1.640 0.101
PORTPRL 1.459 0.711 0.046 2.052 0.040 PORTPRL 1.527 0.705 0.048 2.167 0.030
PORTSDG 0.925 0.418 0.052 2.214 0.027 PORTSDG 0.880 0.414 0.050 2.126 0.034
PORTWAS 1.976 0.960 0.045 2.059 0.040 PORTWAS 1.926 0.951 0.044 2.025 0.043
PORTFTI 1.928 0.615 0.079 3.134 0.002 PORTFTI 1.881 0.610 0.077 3.085 0.002
DEPCS -0.040 0.599 -0.002 -0.066 0.947 DEPCS -0.011 0.594 -0.001 -0.019 0.985
DEPNAV 0.172 2.232 0.002 0.077 0.939 DEPNAV 0.402 2.213 0.004 0.182 0.856
DEPOPS -1.008 0.538 -0.055 -1.872 0.061 DEPOPS -1.034 0.534 -0.056 -1.938 0.053
DEPENG -0.037 0.534 -0.002 -0.069 0.945 DEPENG -0.110 0.529 -0.006 -0.207 0.836
DEPOTH -2.447 0.735 -0.090 -3.329 0.001 DEPOTH -2.552 0.729 -0.094 -3.502 0.000




Std. Error of 






1 .290 .084 .070 .290 1 .317 .101 .086 7.720
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 12158 35 347 5.727 .000 Regression 14516 36 403 6.765 .000
Residual 132235 2180 61 Residual 129878 2179 60
Total 144394 2215 Total 144394 2215











































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.316 0.034 9.201 0.000 (Constant) 0.375 0.036 10.570 0.000
AGE2021 -0.067 0.033 -0.045 -2.050 0.040 AGE2021 -0.063 0.032 -0.043 -1.937 0.053
AGE2429 0.044 0.029 0.042 1.496 0.135 AGE2429 0.039 0.029 0.038 1.353 0.176
AGE30PL 0.034 0.053 0.025 0.648 0.517 AGE30PL 0.032 0.052 0.024 0.620 0.535
FEMALE 0.011 0.024 0.010 0.451 0.652 FEMALE 0.013 0.024 0.012 0.553 0.580
ETHBLK 0.160 0.034 0.103 4.705 0.000 ETHBLK 0.151 0.034 0.096 4.454 0.000
ETHHIS 0.100 0.041 0.052 2.443 0.015 ETHHIS 0.096 0.040 0.050 2.365 0.018
ETHASN 0.055 0.041 0.029 1.363 0.173 ETHASN 0.048 0.040 0.025 1.198 0.231
ETHOTH 0.013 0.053 0.005 0.245 0.806 ETHOTH 0.016 0.053 0.007 0.311 0.756
CSNROTC -0.007 0.026 -0.007 -0.255 0.799 CSNROTC -0.011 0.026 -0.011 -0.434 0.664
CSOCS 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.664 0.507 CSOCS 0.014 0.031 0.014 0.458 0.647
CSECP -0.131 0.053 -0.062 -2.461 0.014 CSECP -0.126 0.053 -0.060 -2.385 0.017
CSLDO -0.065 0.067 -0.034 -0.979 0.328 CSLDO -0.067 0.066 -0.035 -1.015 0.310
CSCWO 0.095 0.076 0.060 1.240 0.215 CSCWO 0.121 0.076 0.077 1.593 0.111
COLLMC -0.133 0.048 -0.061 -2.793 0.005 COLLMC -0.135 0.047 -0.061 -2.849 0.004
COLLLC 0.005 0.039 0.003 0.125 0.901 COLLLC 0.008 0.039 0.005 0.209 0.834
MAJENG -0.062 0.027 -0.052 -2.303 0.021 MAJENG -0.059 0.027 -0.050 -2.218 0.027
MAJMSCI -0.002 0.029 -0.001 -0.067 0.947 MAJMSCI 0.001 0.029 0.000 0.019 0.985
MAJBSCI -0.090 0.040 -0.049 -2.225 0.026 MAJBSCI -0.090 0.040 -0.049 -2.252 0.024
MAJHUM -0.009 0.039 -0.005 -0.228 0.820 MAJHUM -0.002 0.038 -0.001 -0.060 0.952
MAJOTH 0.074 0.060 0.026 1.236 0.216 MAJOTH 0.073 0.059 0.026 1.221 0.222
MARRIED -0.049 0.024 -0.050 -2.078 0.038 MARRIED -0.048 0.023 -0.049 -2.044 0.041
SHIPFFG 0.023 0.034 0.018 0.687 0.492 SHIPFFG 0.023 0.033 0.018 0.695 0.487
SHIPCG -0.004 0.029 -0.003 -0.129 0.897 SHIPCG -0.004 0.029 -0.003 -0.137 0.891
SHIPAMP -0.011 0.027 -0.010 -0.408 0.683 SHIPAMP -0.019 0.027 -0.018 -0.711 0.477
SHIPOTH -0.064 0.056 -0.025 -1.144 0.253 SHIPOTH -0.050 0.055 -0.020 -0.902 0.367
PORTGJAP -0.054 0.033 -0.038 -1.638 0.102 PORTGJAP -0.036 0.033 -0.025 -1.112 0.266
PORTPRL -0.124 0.041 -0.069 -3.030 0.002 PORTPRL -0.128 0.041 -0.071 -3.145 0.002
PORTSDG -0.058 0.024 -0.058 -2.395 0.017 PORTSDG -0.055 0.024 -0.055 -2.312 0.021
PORTWAS -0.111 0.055 -0.045 -2.011 0.044 PORTWAS -0.108 0.055 -0.043 -1.978 0.048
PORTFTI -0.069 0.035 -0.050 -1.962 0.050 PORTFTI -0.067 0.035 -0.048 -1.905 0.057
DEPCS -0.012 0.034 -0.010 -0.334 0.739 DEPCS -0.013 0.034 -0.011 -0.382 0.703
DEPNAV 0.056 0.128 0.009 0.440 0.660 DEPNAV 0.044 0.127 0.007 0.345 0.730
DEPOPS 0.065 0.031 0.062 2.088 0.037 DEPOPS 0.066 0.031 0.063 2.151 0.032
DEPENG 0.006 0.031 0.006 0.186 0.852 DEPENG 0.010 0.030 0.010 0.317 0.752
DEPOTH 0.091 0.042 0.060 2.162 0.031 DEPOTH 0.097 0.042 0.063 2.315 0.021












1 .229 .052 .037 .448 1 .260 .067 .052 .445
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 24.195 35 .691 3.444 .000 Regression 31.120 36 .864 4.374 .000
Residual 437.610 2180 .201 Residual 430.685 2179 .198
Total 461.805 2215 Total 461.805 2215






























































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 79.949 1.300 61.521 0.000 (Constant) 79.158 1.350 58.640 0.000
AGE2021 -0.354 1.269 -0.009 -0.279 0.781 AGE2021 -0.295 1.267 -0.008 -0.233 0.816
AGE2429 -1.996 1.028 -0.076 -1.942 0.052 AGE2429 -1.870 1.027 -0.071 -1.820 0.069
AGE30PL -7.051 2.164 -0.177 -3.259 0.001 AGE30PL -6.993 2.160 -0.176 -3.238 0.001
FEMALE -3.573 0.918 -0.125 -3.892 0.000 FEMALE -3.618 0.917 -0.126 -3.947 0.000
ETHBLK -5.043 1.344 -0.118 -3.753 0.000 ETHBLK -4.912 1.343 -0.115 -3.659 0.000
ETHHIS -2.231 1.554 -0.044 -1.436 0.151 ETHHIS -2.204 1.551 -0.044 -1.421 0.156
ETHASN -1.947 1.598 -0.038 -1.218 0.223 ETHASN -1.789 1.597 -0.035 -1.121 0.263
ETHOTH 0.118 1.846 0.002 0.064 0.949 ETHOTH 0.106 1.843 0.002 0.058 0.954
CSNROTC -2.336 0.987 -0.086 -2.367 0.018 CSNROTC -2.335 0.985 -0.086 -2.371 0.018
CSOCS -2.622 1.111 -0.102 -2.359 0.019 CSOCS -2.680 1.110 -0.104 -2.415 0.016
CSECP 0.675 2.123 0.011 0.318 0.751 CSECP 0.676 2.119 0.011 0.319 0.750
CSLDO 0.978 2.818 0.017 0.347 0.729 CSLDO 1.192 2.814 0.021 0.424 0.672
CSCWO -9.503 3.143 -0.205 -3.023 0.003 CSCWO -9.874 3.142 -0.213 -3.142 0.002
COLLMC 2.890 1.805 0.051 1.602 0.110 COLLMC 2.881 1.801 0.051 1.599 0.110
COLLLC -1.805 1.554 -0.037 -1.161 0.246 COLLLC -1.749 1.552 -0.036 -1.127 0.260
MAJENG 4.228 0.980 0.143 4.315 0.000 MAJENG 4.162 0.978 0.140 4.254 0.000
MAJMSCI 2.488 1.115 0.073 2.232 0.026 MAJMSCI 2.377 1.114 0.070 2.134 0.033
MAJBSCI 1.505 1.535 0.032 0.981 0.327 MAJBSCI 1.388 1.533 0.029 0.905 0.366
MAJHUM 3.763 1.420 0.084 2.651 0.008 MAJHUM 3.638 1.418 0.082 2.565 0.010
MAJOTH 3.363 2.355 0.044 1.428 0.154 MAJOTH 3.295 2.350 0.043 1.402 0.161
MARRIED 0.607 0.901 0.023 0.674 0.501 MARRIED 0.564 0.900 0.022 0.627 0.531
SHIPFFG -1.516 1.305 -0.046 -1.161 0.246 SHIPFFG -1.581 1.303 -0.048 -1.213 0.225
SHIPCG -4.448 1.177 -0.125 -3.780 0.000 SHIPCG -4.345 1.175 -0.122 -3.697 0.000
SHIPAMP 0.477 1.032 0.017 0.462 0.644 SHIPAMP 0.521 1.030 0.019 0.506 0.613
SHIPOTH -2.634 2.101 -0.041 -1.254 0.210 SHIPOTH -2.757 2.098 -0.042 -1.314 0.189
PORTGJAP -0.152 1.193 -0.004 -0.127 0.899 PORTGJAP -0.417 1.197 -0.012 -0.348 0.728
PORTPRL 3.751 1.616 0.076 2.321 0.021 PORTPRL 3.598 1.614 0.073 2.229 0.026
PORTSDG 1.772 0.923 0.068 1.921 0.055 PORTSDG 1.730 0.921 0.067 1.879 0.061
PORTWAS 1.031 2.048 0.016 0.504 0.615 PORTWAS 1.317 2.048 0.021 0.643 0.520
PORTFTI 2.163 1.358 0.062 1.592 0.112 PORTFTI 2.248 1.356 0.065 1.657 0.098
DEPCS 1.654 1.330 0.052 1.244 0.214 DEPCS 1.626 1.327 0.051 1.225 0.221
DEPNAV 2.576 6.411 0.012 0.402 0.688 DEPNAV 2.297 6.400 0.011 0.359 0.720
DEPOPS 0.794 1.180 0.029 0.673 0.501 DEPOPS 0.771 1.178 0.028 0.655 0.513
DEPENG 0.395 1.167 0.015 0.338 0.735 DEPENG 0.369 1.165 0.014 0.317 0.751
DEPOTH -0.205 1.550 -0.005 -0.132 0.895 DEPOTH -0.251 1.547 -0.007 -0.163 0.871




Std. Error of 






1 .462 .214 .182 10.796 1 .466 .218 .185 10.775
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 27751 35 793 6.803 .000 Regression 28270 36 785 6.764 .000
Residual 102216 877 117 Residual 101697 876 116





ANOVA Table ANOVA Table






































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.211 0.051 4.157 0.000 (Constant) 0.215 0.053 4.062 0.000
AGE2021 0.055 0.050 0.037 1.112 0.266 AGE2021 0.055 0.050 0.037 1.106 0.269
AGE2429 0.078 0.040 0.078 1.929 0.054 AGE2429 0.077 0.040 0.077 1.910 0.056
AGE30PL 0.221 0.085 0.146 2.606 0.009 AGE30PL 0.220 0.085 0.146 2.601 0.009
FEMALE 0.053 0.036 0.049 1.473 0.141 FEMALE 0.053 0.036 0.049 1.478 0.140
ETHBLK 0.222 0.053 0.137 4.221 0.000 ETHBLK 0.221 0.053 0.137 4.202 0.000
ETHHIS 0.110 0.061 0.058 1.816 0.070 ETHHIS 0.110 0.061 0.058 1.813 0.070
ETHASN 0.127 0.062 0.065 2.031 0.043 ETHASN 0.126 0.063 0.065 2.016 0.044
ETHOTH -0.048 0.072 -0.021 -0.665 0.506 ETHOTH -0.048 0.072 -0.021 -0.664 0.507
CSNROTC 0.084 0.039 0.081 2.167 0.030 CSNROTC 0.084 0.039 0.081 2.166 0.031
CSOCS 0.084 0.043 0.085 1.921 0.055 CSOCS 0.084 0.043 0.086 1.926 0.054
CSECP 0.062 0.083 0.027 0.743 0.458 CSECP 0.062 0.083 0.027 0.743 0.458
CSLDO 0.006 0.110 0.003 0.055 0.956 CSLDO 0.005 0.110 0.002 0.045 0.964
CSCWO 0.298 0.123 0.169 2.426 0.015 CSCWO 0.300 0.123 0.170 2.435 0.015
COLLMC -0.106 0.071 -0.049 -1.500 0.134 COLLMC -0.106 0.071 -0.049 -1.498 0.134
COLLLC 0.081 0.061 0.044 1.330 0.184 COLLLC 0.081 0.061 0.043 1.325 0.185
MAJENG -0.140 0.038 -0.124 -3.649 0.000 MAJENG -0.139 0.038 -0.124 -3.637 0.000
MAJMSCI -0.097 0.044 -0.075 -2.227 0.026 MAJMSCI -0.097 0.044 -0.075 -2.212 0.027
MAJBSCI 0.024 0.060 0.013 0.393 0.694 MAJBSCI 0.024 0.060 0.013 0.402 0.688
MAJHUM -0.057 0.056 -0.034 -1.035 0.301 MAJHUM -0.057 0.056 -0.034 -1.023 0.306
MAJOTH -0.078 0.092 -0.027 -0.847 0.397 MAJOTH -0.078 0.092 -0.027 -0.843 0.399
MARRIED -0.034 0.035 -0.035 -0.970 0.332 MARRIED -0.034 0.035 -0.035 -0.964 0.335
SHIPFFG -0.005 0.051 -0.004 -0.096 0.924 SHIPFFG -0.005 0.051 -0.004 -0.090 0.928
SHIPCG 0.109 0.046 0.081 2.363 0.018 SHIPCG 0.108 0.046 0.080 2.350 0.019
SHIPAMP -0.018 0.040 -0.018 -0.457 0.648 SHIPAMP -0.019 0.040 -0.018 -0.462 0.645
SHIPOTH 0.121 0.082 0.049 1.467 0.143 SHIPOTH 0.121 0.082 0.049 1.473 0.141
PORTGJAP -0.017 0.047 -0.013 -0.375 0.708 PORTGJAP -0.016 0.047 -0.012 -0.346 0.729
PORTPRL -0.096 0.063 -0.051 -1.521 0.129 PORTPRL -0.095 0.063 -0.051 -1.508 0.132
PORTSDG -0.072 0.036 -0.073 -1.997 0.046 PORTSDG -0.072 0.036 -0.073 -1.990 0.047
PORTWAS -0.008 0.080 -0.003 -0.101 0.920 PORTWAS -0.009 0.080 -0.004 -0.117 0.907
PORTFTI -0.048 0.053 -0.036 -0.903 0.367 PORTFTI -0.048 0.053 -0.037 -0.910 0.363
DEPCS -0.035 0.052 -0.030 -0.682 0.496 DEPCS -0.035 0.052 -0.029 -0.679 0.498
DEPNAV 0.130 0.251 0.016 0.518 0.604 DEPNAV 0.131 0.251 0.017 0.523 0.601
DEPOPS 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.073 0.942 DEPOPS 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.075 0.940
DEPENG -0.015 0.046 -0.015 -0.337 0.736 DEPENG -0.015 0.046 -0.015 -0.334 0.738
DEPOTH 0.012 0.061 0.008 0.203 0.839 DEPOTH 0.013 0.061 0.009 0.206 0.837












1 .404 .163 .130 .422 1 .404 .163 .129 .422
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 30.525 35 .872 4.894 .000 Regression 30.536 36 .848 4.755 .000
Residual 156.290 877 .178 Residual 156.278 876 .178
Total 186.815 912 Total 186.815 912



































































B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 83.280 1.185 70.307 0.000 (Constant) 82.505 1.195 69.065 0.000
AGE2021 1.360 1.158 0.054 1.175 0.241 AGE2021 1.311 1.145 0.052 1.144 0.253
AGE2429 -1.847 1.001 -0.105 -1.845 0.066 AGE2429 -1.796 0.990 -0.102 -1.814 0.070
AGE30PL -5.070 2.082 -0.119 -2.435 0.015 AGE30PL -5.067 2.059 -0.119 -2.461 0.014
FEMALE 0.196 0.848 0.011 0.232 0.817 FEMALE -0.006 0.841 0.000 -0.007 0.994
ETHBLK -4.555 1.240 -0.167 -3.672 0.000 ETHBLK -4.160 1.232 -0.153 -3.375 0.001
ETHHIS -3.440 1.554 -0.098 -2.213 0.027 ETHHIS -3.367 1.537 -0.096 -2.190 0.029
ETHASN -1.019 1.520 -0.030 -0.671 0.503 ETHASN -1.015 1.504 -0.030 -0.675 0.500
ETHOTH 1.493 2.983 0.022 0.500 0.617 ETHOTH 1.761 2.952 0.026 0.597 0.551
CSNROTC -0.356 0.957 -0.020 -0.373 0.710 CSNROTC -0.245 0.947 -0.014 -0.258 0.796
CSOCS -0.157 1.037 -0.010 -0.152 0.880 CSOCS 0.023 1.027 0.001 0.022 0.982
CSECP 2.149 2.564 0.040 0.838 0.402 CSECP 1.999 2.536 0.037 0.788 0.431
COLLMC 1.677 1.762 0.042 0.952 0.342 COLLMC 1.545 1.743 0.039 0.886 0.376
COLLLC -3.305 1.257 -0.123 -2.630 0.009 COLLLC -3.622 1.247 -0.134 -2.905 0.004
MAJENG 2.304 0.999 0.108 2.306 0.022 MAJENG 2.273 0.988 0.107 2.299 0.022
MAJMSCI 1.445 1.030 0.065 1.402 0.161 MAJMSCI 1.330 1.019 0.060 1.304 0.193
MAJBSCI 0.277 2.028 0.006 0.136 0.892 MAJBSCI 1.107 2.021 0.025 0.548 0.584
MAJHUM -1.999 1.387 -0.066 -1.441 0.150 MAJHUM -2.339 1.376 -0.077 -1.700 0.090
MAJOTH 0.114 1.948 0.003 0.058 0.953 MAJOTH 0.124 1.927 0.003 0.065 0.949
MARRIED -0.180 0.875 -0.010 -0.205 0.838 MARRIED -0.230 0.866 -0.013 -0.265 0.791
SHIPFFG -0.953 1.302 -0.037 -0.732 0.464 SHIPFFG -1.428 1.295 -0.055 -1.102 0.271
SHIPCG -0.336 1.083 -0.015 -0.311 0.756 SHIPCG -0.411 1.071 -0.018 -0.384 0.702
SHIPAMP 0.230 0.993 0.012 0.232 0.817 SHIPAMP 0.242 0.982 0.013 0.247 0.805
SHIPOTH -4.668 1.898 -0.115 -2.460 0.014 SHIPOTH -5.204 1.884 -0.129 -2.763 0.006
PORTGJAP -0.777 1.172 -0.032 -0.663 0.508 PORTGJAP -0.880 1.159 -0.037 -0.759 0.448
PORTPRL 1.113 1.382 0.039 0.806 0.421 PORTPRL 1.207 1.367 0.042 0.883 0.378
PORTSDG 2.028 0.899 0.115 2.256 0.025 PORTSDG 1.983 0.890 0.113 2.229 0.026
PORTWAS 2.083 2.263 0.043 0.921 0.358 PORTWAS 1.725 2.240 0.036 0.770 0.442
PORTFTI -0.425 1.451 -0.014 -0.293 0.770 PORTFTI -0.050 1.439 -0.002 -0.035 0.972
DEPCS -0.233 1.211 -0.011 -0.192 0.848 DEPCS -0.034 1.199 -0.002 -0.028 0.978
DEPNAV -3.200 4.017 -0.036 -0.797 0.426 DEPNAV -2.717 3.976 -0.031 -0.683 0.495
DEPOPS 0.794 1.082 0.043 0.734 0.463 DEPOPS 0.669 1.071 0.036 0.625 0.532
DEPENG 0.906 1.072 0.051 0.846 0.398 DEPENG 0.833 1.060 0.047 0.785 0.433
DEPOTH -4.136 1.626 -0.135 -2.544 0.011 DEPOTH -4.241 1.608 -0.138 -2.637 0.009




Std. Error of 






1 .429 .184 .124 7.566 1 .452 .204 .143 7.483
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 5779 33 175 3.059 .000 Regression 6395 34 188 3.359 .000
Residual 25589 447 57 Residual 24973 446 56




Coefficients t-value Sig. Level






























B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.026 0.043 0.606 0.545 (Constant) 0.043 0.043 0.989 0.323
AGE2021 -0.032 0.042 -0.036 -0.766 0.444 AGE2021 -0.031 0.042 -0.035 -0.742 0.458
AGE2429 0.006 0.036 0.010 0.163 0.871 AGE2429 0.005 0.036 0.008 0.128 0.898
AGE30PL 0.217 0.073 0.150 2.959 0.003 AGE30PL 0.215 0.073 0.149 2.947 0.003
FEMALE 0.003 0.031 0.004 0.086 0.932 FEMALE 0.007 0.031 0.011 0.236 0.814
ETHBLK 0.143 0.045 0.150 3.185 0.002 ETHBLK 0.134 0.045 0.141 2.990 0.003
ETHHIS 0.181 0.055 0.150 3.285 0.001 ETHHIS 0.179 0.055 0.148 3.250 0.001
ETHASN 0.074 0.055 0.062 1.342 0.180 ETHASN 0.074 0.055 0.062 1.344 0.179
ETHOTH 0.047 0.108 0.020 0.440 0.660 ETHOTH 0.042 0.107 0.018 0.387 0.699
CSNROTC 0.049 0.035 0.079 1.423 0.155 CSNROTC 0.047 0.034 0.075 1.354 0.176
CSOCS 0.023 0.037 0.040 0.614 0.539 CSOCS 0.019 0.037 0.033 0.508 0.611
CSECP -0.022 0.093 -0.012 -0.236 0.814 CSECP -0.018 0.092 -0.010 -0.197 0.844
COLLMC 0.022 0.064 0.016 0.350 0.727 COLLMC 0.025 0.063 0.018 0.399 0.690
COLLLC 0.067 0.045 0.072 1.487 0.138 COLLLC 0.074 0.045 0.079 1.634 0.103
MAJENG -0.036 0.036 -0.048 -0.989 0.323 MAJENG -0.035 0.036 -0.047 -0.971 0.332
MAJMSCI -0.009 0.037 -0.012 -0.249 0.803 MAJMSCI -0.007 0.037 -0.009 -0.190 0.849
MAJBSCI -0.014 0.073 -0.009 -0.197 0.844 MAJBSCI -0.033 0.074 -0.021 -0.443 0.658
MAJHUM -0.004 0.050 -0.004 -0.075 0.940 MAJHUM 0.004 0.050 0.003 0.074 0.941
MAJOTH -0.011 0.070 -0.007 -0.152 0.879 MAJOTH -0.011 0.070 -0.007 -0.156 0.876
MARRIED 0.050 0.031 0.079 1.574 0.116 MARRIED 0.051 0.031 0.081 1.626 0.105
SHIPFFG -0.064 0.047 -0.070 -1.357 0.175 SHIPFFG -0.053 0.047 -0.059 -1.132 0.258
SHIPCG 0.000 0.039 -0.001 -0.012 0.991 SHIPCG 0.001 0.039 0.001 0.024 0.981
SHIPAMP -0.035 0.036 -0.052 -0.966 0.334 SHIPAMP -0.035 0.036 -0.052 -0.984 0.326
SHIPOTH 0.141 0.068 0.100 2.063 0.040 SHIPOTH 0.153 0.068 0.109 2.241 0.026
PORTGJAP 0.000 0.042 0.001 0.011 0.991 PORTGJAP 0.002 0.042 0.003 0.056 0.955
PORTPRL -0.003 0.050 -0.003 -0.068 0.945 PORTPRL -0.005 0.050 -0.005 -0.110 0.912
PORTSDG -0.030 0.032 -0.048 -0.912 0.362 PORTSDG -0.029 0.032 -0.047 -0.886 0.376
PORTWAS -0.017 0.082 -0.010 -0.203 0.840 PORTWAS -0.009 0.082 -0.005 -0.106 0.916
PORTFTI -0.010 0.052 -0.010 -0.197 0.844 PORTFTI -0.019 0.052 -0.018 -0.354 0.723
DEPCS 0.052 0.044 0.068 1.190 0.235 DEPCS 0.048 0.044 0.063 1.098 0.273
DEPNAV 0.231 0.145 0.074 1.588 0.113 DEPNAV 0.220 0.145 0.071 1.522 0.129
DEPOPS -0.014 0.039 -0.021 -0.358 0.721 DEPOPS -0.011 0.039 -0.017 -0.287 0.774
DEPENG -0.007 0.039 -0.011 -0.179 0.858 DEPENG -0.005 0.038 -0.008 -0.129 0.897
DEPOTH 0.039 0.059 0.037 0.670 0.503 DEPOTH 0.042 0.058 0.039 0.719 0.473












1 .352 .124 .060 .273 1 .363 .132 .066 .273
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 4.764 33 .144 1.930 .002 Regression 5.064 34 .149 2.005 .001
Residual 33.584 449 .075 Residual 33.284 448 .074




Coefficients t-value Sig. Level
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Protocol for Ship Visits 
On each ship, we would like to be able to meet with the following people as availability allows:  
116X/111/X division officers (group 1), department heads (group 2), and members of the Chiefs’ 
Mess (group 3).  If possible, we would like an hour for each of these meetings.  We would like to 
finish with an office call with the CO and/or XO. 
The questions we want to ask everyone are: 
1.  Ideally, what needs to be in place to efficiently and effectively train a SWO JO—both in 
port and underway? 
2. Please address the following factors: 
a. Expectations following ATG training 
b. In port vs. underway time 
c. Effects of ship type and home port 
d. Roles of senior enlisted, department heads, the senior watch officer, XO, and CO. 
e. Training climate 
f. Other? (When we do this kind of work, we go in with a set of questions but fully 
expect people we are interviewing to tell us other factors that we did not 
anticipate that impact good training. This is why we do interviews as opposed to 




USS CHUNG-HOON SWO University 
 
Week 1  Basic Damage Control 
 
Topics  Introduction to Damage Control 
  Safety Precautions 
  Communications 
  DC Organization 
  Repair Locker Walkthrough 
  Fire Team Composition 
  Watertight Enclosures/Hull Fittings 
  Installed Fire Extinguishing Equipment 
  AFFF 
  Firemain/Firepumps 
  Installed Drainage 
  Casualty Power 
  CBR Detection Equipment 
  Battle Damage Repair 
  Ventilation 
  Dewatering Equipment/Pumps 
  Pipe Repair/Patching 
  Plugging/Shoring 
  Classes of Fire/Causes 
  Conflagaration/ Conflag Station 
  EEBD/Egress/SCBA 
  Crash and Salvage Equipment 
  Basic First Aid 
  Dressing Wounds/Battle Dressing Training 
  Shipwide DC Equipment Walkthrough 
 
Week 2  Shiphandling/OOD Week 
 
Topics  Bridge Walkthrough 
  Navigation Equipment Familiarization 
  VMS/BME/SPS-67 Training 
  Rules of the Road Introduction 
  Man Overboard Procedures 
  Deck Seamanship 
  Deck Equipment 
  Underway Replenishment 
  Refueling Stations & Equipment 
  Anchoring 
  Towing 
  Mooring to a Buoy 
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  Standard Commands 
  Watch Team Organization 
  Basic Shiphandling 
  UNREP Equipment Walkthrough 
  Sea & Anchor (to/from pier) 
  Flight Operations 
  Rules of the Road 
 
CO’s Roundtable (USS STARK Case Study) 
 
Week 3  Weapons/ Combat Systems Week 
 
Topics  ATTWO/GLO Overview 
  Introduction to Aegis 
  CWC Concept 
  Radar Fundamentals 
  Antenna Familiarization 
  Radio/Telephone Procedures 
  Naval Communications 
  Wave Propagation  
  Radio Walkthrough 
  SLQ-32 
  SRBOC 
  NULKA 
  EW 
  SESS 
  Sound Propagation 
  Sonar 
  ASW Communications 
  ASW Organization 
  ASW Aircraft and Sonobuoy 
  ASW Tactics 
  Sonar Space Walkthrough 
  US Naval Assets  
  Naval Missiles 
  ASCM Defense 
  Naval Gun and Ammunition 
  Gunfire Control 
  Gun Mount and Magazine Walkthrough 
  Strike Warfare Overview 
 
Week 4 Engineering Week 
 
Topics  Engineering Administration 
  GTM Overview 
  GTE Fuel Services 
  Main Space Familiarization 
  CPP 
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  Fuel System 
  Pollution Control 
  Propulsion Cycle 
  Auxillary Equipment 
  A/C & Refrigeration Plant 
  Reverse Osmosis 
  RHIB 
  RAST 
  Low Pressure Air Compressors 
  Electrical Distribution 
  Switchboards 
  Degaussing 
  EPCC 
  Steering 
  CCS (Equipment and Watchstations) 
  Engineering Watch Organization 
Main Space Walkthrough 
CO’s Roundtable (USS FORRESTAL Case Study) 
   
Week 5 Mixed Bag Week 
 
Topics  Supply Requisition Chain 
  OMMS-NG Familiarization 
  SKED 
  3M Basics 
  Spot Check Training 
  43P1 
  HAZMAT/HMUG/MSDS 
  EGL/IGL 
  Division Officer SORM Responsibilities   
  Division Officer Afloat PQS 
  FLTMPS 
  Division Officer Toolbox 
  TORIS/TFOM 
  Administrative Organization 
  Enlisted Evaluation and Advancement Systems 
  Zone Inspection 
 
Week 6 CIC Week 
 
Topics  Moboards 
  CIC Mission 
  CIC Publications, Logs and Administration 
  NSFS Mission and Organization 
  Standing the Watch (CICWO/SUWC) 
  DIVTACS/FLT TAC 
  Rules of the Road/MOBOARD/FLT TAC Practicals 
  CO’s Roundtable (NASA: Space Shuttle Challenger Case Study) 
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SWO Candidate Watch Rotation 1700-2200 daily starting 01JUN11 
   
              




        Watch Station Title   
  
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10 
Bridge/JOOW 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SUWC   
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 
CICWS   
  
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 
TIC   
  
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 
CSC   
  
5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 
CCS/EOOW 
  
6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 
S&S   
  
7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ERO   
  
8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
OIL KING   
  
9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SONAR SUPE 
  
10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
              Note: Each SWO candidate will rotate daily through the course of the SWO University program.  By design,  
   the SWO Candidate will experience the different departments and divisions through the 2nd Tour Division 
   Officers and Limited Duty Officers. SWO Candidates will attend Departmental Khaki Call and Quarters  
    with their running mate and work within the division from 1200-1700 while underway daily. 
     
              1   
            2   
            3   
            4   
            5   
            6   
            7   
            8   
            9   
            10   
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SWO Candidate Division Rotation starting 01JUN11 
  
          Division Officer/LDO   
 
SWO Candidate 
    Running Mate Title   
  
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 
NAV 
   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CICO 
   
2 3 4 5 6 1 
DCA 
   
3 4 5 6 1 2 
TRAINO 
   
4 5 6 1 2 3 
MPA 
   
5 6 1 2 3 4 
FCO 
   
6 1 2 3 4 5 
          Note: Each SWO candidate will rotate weekly through the course of the SWO University program.  By design,  
the SWO Candidate will experience the different departments and divisions through the 2nd Tour Division 
Officers and Limited Duty Officers. SWO Candidates will attend Departmental Khaki Call and Quarters  
with their running mate and work within the division from 1200-1700 while underway daily. 
 
          1   
        2   
        3   
        4   
        5   
        6   
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